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We review major developments in national environmental policy during the 
Clinton Administration, defining environmental policy to include not only the statutes, 
regulations, and policies associated with reducing pollution, but also major issues of 
public lands management and species preservation. We adopt economic criteria for policy 
assessment and highlight a set of five themes that emerge in the economics of national 
environmental policy over the past decade.  
 
  First, over the course of the decade, national environmental targets were made 
more stringent, and environmental quality improved.  Most important among the new 
targets were the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for ambient ozone 
and particulate matter, issued by EPA in July 1997, which could turn out to be one of the 
Clinton Administration’s most enduring environmental legacies.  Also, natural resource 
policy during the Clinton years was heavily weighted toward environmental protection.  
Environmental quality improved overall during the decade, continuing a trend that began 
in the 1970s, although improvements were much less than during the previous two 
decades. 
 
  Second, the use of benefit-cost analysis for assessing environmental regulation 
was controversial in the Clinton Administration, while economic efficiency emerged as a 
central goal of the regulatory reform movement in the Congress during the 1990s.  When 
attention was given to increased efficiency, the locus of that attention during the Clinton 
years was the Congress in the case of environmental policies and the Administration in 
the case of natural resource policies.  Ironically, the increased attention given to benefit-
cost analysis may not have had a marked effect on the economic efficiency of 
environmental regulations.  
 
  Third, cost-effectiveness achieved a much more p rominent position in public 
discourse regarding environmental policy during the 1990s.  From the Bush 
Administration through the Clinton Administration, interest and activity regarding 
market-based instruments for environmental protection—particularly tradeable permit 
systems—continued to increase.   
 
  Fourth, the Clinton Administration put much greater emphasis than previous 
administrations on expanding the role of environmental information disclosure and 
voluntary programs.  While such programs can provide cost-effective ways of reaching 
environmental policy goals, little is known about their actual costs or effectiveness.   
 
Fifth and finally, the Environmental Protection Agency placed much less 
emphasis on economic analysis during the 1990s.  EPA leadership was more hostile to 
economic analysis than it had been under the prior Bush Administration, and it made 
organizational changes to reflect this change in priorities. i 
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National Environmental Policy During the Clinton Years 
 
Sheila M. Cavanagh, Robert W. Hahn, and Robert N. Stavins 
 
I. Introduction 
  We examine from an economic perspective major developments in national 
environmental policy during the two terms of the Clinton Administration, 1992 through 
2000. We define environmental policy broadly to include not only the statutes, 
regulations, and policies associated with reducing environmental pollution, but also major 
issues of natural resource management.  Issues that might fall within a comprehensive 
assessment of environmental and natural resource policy, but which are covered by other 
papers in this series, such as energy policy, are not included in our investigation. 
  Our analysis is primarily descriptive, although in some of the cases in which 
environmental policies have been analyzed from an economic perspective, we discuss 
those results. Moreover, the analysis is not exhaustive.  While our choice of which 
policies and programs to discuss in depth has inevitably been somewhat arbitrary, we 
include the most important and the most prominent intersections of economics and 
environment over the decade.  Finally, while we do mention a number of policies and 
programs administered by agencies other than the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), rules promulgated by EPA comprise a substantial majority of t otal costs and 
benefits of Federal environmental regulation.  We therefore discuss at length the use and 
acceptance of economics at EPA.  Discussion of similar issues at the Departments of 
Energy, Agriculture, the Interior, and other agencies and institutions is beyond the scope 
of this study. 
  A fundamental issue that confronts our assessment is the choice of an appropriate 
basis of comparison for evaluating policy initiatives.  It might appear reasonable to 
contrast first-term Clinton Administration initiatives with what might have been 
anticipated from a hypothetical second-term Bush Administration, but what would the 
appropriate counterfactual be for the second term of the Clinton years?  The impossibility 
of providing a definitive answer to that question leads us to take a different approach, 
adopting economic criteria for policy assessment—principally efficiency, cost   2
effectiveness, and distributional equity.
1 
  Five themes emerge from our review of national environmental policy during the 
years of the Clinton Administration.  First, over the course of the decade, environmental 
targets were made more stringent, and environmental quality improved.  Most important 
among the new targets were the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for 
ambient ozone and particulate matter, issued by EPA in July, 1997, which could turn out 
to be one of the Clinton Administration’s most enduring environmental legacies, both in 
terms of potential benefits and potential costs.  Natural resource policy during the Clinton 
years was heavily weighted toward environmental protection.  The Administration 
proposed initiatives to reduce subsidies for private resource extraction on public lands.  In 
addition, the U.S. Forest Service shifted priorities away from a focus on timber 
production to resource protection, placing 60 million acres of Federal forests off limits to 
road building.  Clinton also designated more than 20 new national monuments, thus 
restricting the use of 6 million additional acres of Federal lands.  Environmental quality 
improved overall during the decade, continuing a trend that started in the 1970s, although 
trends in water quality were less clear than trends in air quality.  Environmental quality 
improvements were much less than during the previous two decades, not surprising given 
that the low-hanging fruit had already been picked.  
  Second, the use of benefit-cost analysis for assessing environmental regulation 
was controversial in the Clinton Administration, while economic efficiency emerged as a 
central goal of the regulatory reform movement in the Congress during the 1990s.  
Despite a series of supportive executive orders, economic efficiency appears not to have 
been accepted as a legitimate criterion for environmental policy during the Clinton years.  
In contrast, economic efficiency was a central goal of regulatory reform efforts in the 
Congress.  Major amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act were passed, containing 
the most stringent requirement for benefit-cost analysis of any environmental statute.  
                                                 
1We follow the standard definition of an  efficient environmental policy as being one which involves a 
target—such as a 50 percent reduction in sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions—that maximizes the difference 
between social benefits and social costs, i.e. a target level at which marginal benefits and marginal costs are 
equated.  By cost-effective policies, we refer to those which take (possibly inefficient) targets as given by 
the political process, but achieve those targets with policy instruments—such as a tradeable permit system 
in the SO2 case—that minimize aggregate costs.  Assessments of the distributional implications of 
environmental policies include analyses of the distribution of costs and benefits.   3
Legislators were less successful at reforming other environmental statutes that had been 
criticized on efficiency grounds, but the Congress did pass a variety of cross-cutting 
regulatory reform initiatives, aimed at increasing the efficiency of environmental, health, 
and safety regulations. 
  It is interesting to note that when attention was given to increased efficiency, the 
locus of that attention during the Clinton years was the Congress in the case of 
environmental policies and the Administration in the case of natural resource policies.  
Ironically, the increased attention given to benefit-cost analysis may not have had a 
marked effect on the economic efficiency of environmental regulations.  The evidence 
indicates that the overall benefits of air pollution regulation have exceeded its costs, but 
the picture is mixed when one examines specific air pollution regulations.  In general, 
there appears to be a downward trend in aggregate net benefits of such regulations over 
time, although there are important exceptions among individual regulations, like the new 
NAAQS for particulate matter. 
  Third,  cost-effectiveness achieved a much more prominent position in public 
discourse regarding environmental policy during the 1990s.  From the Bush 
Administration through the Clinton Administration, interest and activity regarding 
market-based instruments for environmental protection—particularly tradeable permit 
systems—continued to increase.  The Administration promoted cost-effectiveness by 
supporting the implementation of existing market-based initiatives, including the sulfur 
dioxide allowance trading program, and by proposing new initiatives, exemplified by the 
strong U.S. support for tradeable permit programs for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  
The performance of market-based instruments that have been implemented in the past 
two decades has been encouraging, including the leaded gasoline phasedown in the 1980s 
and the SO2 allowance trading program in the 1990s. 
  Fourth,  the Clinton Administration put much g reater emphasis than previous 
administrations on expanding the role of environmental information disclosure and 
voluntary programs.  EPA expanded the list of chemicals to be reported under the Toxics 
Release Inventory (TRI), lowered reporting thresholds, and launched a number of other 
information programs.  EPA also initiated dozens of programs designed to encourage 
sources to reduce emissions on a voluntary basis, many under the “Common Sense   4
Initiative.”  While such programs may potentially be cost-effective ways of reaching 
environmental policy goals, we know very little about their costs or their effectiveness.  
  Fifth and finally,  the Environmental Protection Agency reduced the role of 
economic analysis in decisionmaking during the 1990s.  During the Clinton years, the 
EPA was more hostile toward economic analysis than it had been during the prior Bush 
Administration, and EPA leadership made organizational changes to reflect this shift.  
When economics did play a role, economic analysis was more likely to be focused on 
increasing the cost-effectiveness of regulations than on weighing benefits against costs. 
  This paper is divided into five parts. In part 2, we analyze cross-cutting issues that 
stand out from the hundreds of statutes, regulations, and administrative decisions of the 
Clinton years, focusing separately on Congressional initiatives and those that had their 
primary origin within the Administration.  In part 3, we review the most important 
national environmental policy developments from an economic perspective, and in part 4, 
we summarize performance, employing three metrics: environmental quality, cost-
effectiveness, and efficiency.  In part 5, we offer some conclusions. 
 
II. Cross-Cutting Environmental Policy Developments  
 
  A number of broad-based initiatives of the Clinton years—not linked with 
specific environmental problems—potentially had significant impacts on the conduct of 
environmental policy, including initiatives that were intended to affect (or could have 
affected) the efficiency, cost-effectiveness, or distributional equity of environmental 
policies and programs.  Our examination of such cross-cutting initiatives considers them 
as either Executive or Congressional, although this division is not always clear-cut.  It 
can be difficult to discern whether an initiative began in the executive branch or the 
Congress, and any initiative that becomes law must have received the approval of both 
branches.
2 RCRA is another statute for which reform was proposed by the Clinton 
                                                 
2For example, in 1994, the Clinton Administration proposed Superfund reform that would give more 
weight to cleanup costs and greater consideration of future uses in site remedy selection (U.S. Council of 




Congresses, but no Superfund reform bills were enacted.   5
Administration, but not passed by the Congress (U.S. Council of Economic Advisers 
1996).
3  
2.1  Executive Initiatives 
  We consider cross-cutting executive branch initiatives under three categories:  
efficiency-enhancing initiatives; those targeted at distributional equity; and those that 
addressed cost effectiveness. 
2.1.1  Efficiency and Environmental Regulation 
  Since 1981, Federal regulatory agencies have been required to conduct economic 
analyses for regulations with expected annual costs greater than $100 million.
4 
Throughout the Reagan and Bush Administrations, these Regulatory Impact Analyses 
(RIAs) were required under Reagan Executive Orders 12291 and 12498.
5  President 
George H. W. Bush also created a Council on Competitiveness, chaired by Vice President 
Quayle, which reviewed the impact on industry of selected regulations.  Shortly after 
taking office in 1993, President Clinton abolished the Council on Competitiveness and 
revoked both of the Reagan orders, replacing them with Executive Order 12866, 
Regulatory Planning and Review, which requires benefit-cost analysis.
6 
  The Clinton Executive Order (EO) on benefit-cost analysis was substantively and 
administratively similar to the Reagan orders, requiring benefit-cost analysis and cost-
effectiveness analysis of major rules.  It was qualitatively different in tone, however, 
                                                 
3 In 1995, the Administration proposed expediting pesticide registration and other reforms to the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), which were achieved in large part by legislation 
passed by the 104
th Congress in 1996.  
4The threshold is not indexed for inflation and has not been modified over time.  Elsewhere in this paper, 
we refer to  year 2000 dollars, unless we indicate otherwise. 
5Executive Order (EO) 12291 required agencies to conduct a benefit-cost regulatory impact analysis for all 
proposed and final rules that were anticipated to have an effect on the national economy in excess of $100 
million.  Executive Order 12498 required, in addition, a risk assessment for all proposed and final 
environmental health and safety regulations.  EO 12291 has been called the “foremost development in 
administrative law of the 1980s” (Morgenstern 1997b).  The Reagan EOs were not the first presidential 
effort at regulatory efficiency, however.  President Nixon required a “Quality of Life” review of selected 
regulations in 1971, and President Ford formalized this process in EO 11281 in 1974.  President Carter’s 
EO 12044 required analysis of proposed rules and centralized review by the Regulatory Analysis Review 
Group.  It appears that President George W. Bush will continue the RIA requirements of Clinton’s EO 
12866 in some form (Card 2001). 
6In discussing Clinton’s EO 12866, many investigators also mention EO 12875,  Enhancing the 
Intergovernmental Partnership, which limited “unfunded mandates”.  While EO 12875 was part of the 
Administration’s regulatory reform agenda, it did not make reference to the efficiency or cost-effectiveness 
of environmental regulations.   6
signaling a less strict efficiency test, as well as a new emphasis on distributional 
concerns.  While the Reagan orders required that benefits outweigh costs, the Clinton 
order required only that benefits justify costs.  The Clinton EO allowed that: (1) not all 
regulatory benefits and costs can be monetized; and (2) non-monetary consequences 
should be influential in regulatory analysis (Viscusi 1996).  The Clinton order also 
imposed a 90-day limit to the review process by the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB), a process that had frequently extended for years under previous executive orders 
(Morgenstern 2000).  
  While attention to regulatory efficiency may have grown during the 1990s, it 
would be impossible to attribute this growth to the Clinton EO, or any other executive 
action.  Regulatory reform was a major focus of the Congress in the 1990s, as we discuss 
below.  In addition, regulatory impact analysis has continued to be required only for 
major rules, a small fraction of all rules issued by EPA and other agencies. 
2.1.2  Incorporation of Distributional Concerns 
  During the 1990s, the regulatory review process acquired a new focus on 
distributional concerns.  In addition to requiring RIAs, Clinton’s EO 12866 instructs 
agencies to select regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits,  including 
distributive impacts and equity, unless a statute requires another regulatory approach.  
The language of the EO implicitly includes equity in the objective function to be 
maximized, although it is not clear how equity should or can be “maximized.”  In 
practice, agencies have responded to the order by including a separate distributional 
impact analysis within RIAs. 
  In 1994, Executive Order 12898 formalized the President’s stance on what was by 
then called “environmental justice,” instructing each Federal agency to identify and 
address “disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of 
its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income 
populations.” The Administration also supported the filing of environmentally-related 
claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which allows citizens to file 
complaints against EPA alleging discriminatory intent or effect based on race, color or   7
national origin, resulting from the issuance of pollution control permits by state and local 
government agencies receiving EPA funds.
7  
2.1.3  Cost-Effectiveness and Environmental Regulation 
  Executive Order 12866 also mandated selection—when appropriate—of cost-
effective regulatory alternatives, specifically user fees, marketable permits, and 
information programs.  The use of market-based environmental policy instruments grew 
in the 1990s (Hahn 2000, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2001a). The 
proliferation of cap-and-trade programs through the implementation of the 1990 Clean 
Air Act Amendments is one example; the Administration’s aggressive promotion of 
international market-based policy instruments for greenhouse gas emissions control 
(specifically, emissions trading) is another.  Information programs, another type of 
potentially cost-effective market-based environmental policy instrument, received special 
emphasis at EPA during the Clinton years through expanded use of existing policies and 
creation of new ones.  We cannot attribute Federal agencies’ increased use of market-
based instruments to the Clinton EO, because we have no appropriate counterfactual 
against which to measure this kind of progress.
8  In addition, despite the fact that market-
based approaches have been applied frequently to new environmental regulations, the 
bulk of existing regulations were promulgated without regard to cost-effectiveness. 
2.1.4  Political and Administrative Changes in the Use of Economic Analysis at EPA 
  We noted above the ambivalence of the major environmental statutes with respect 
to the role of economic analysis.
9  Such statutory ambivalence was accompanied during 
                                                 
7EPA’s approach to Title VI complaints, issued in February, 1998, complicated urban brownfields cleanup 
and was received poorly by the U.S. Conference of Mayors, suggesting that the means of the focus on 
distributional issues may have been at odds with its goals.  See Browner, Carol M. (1998), “Letter to the 
U.S. Conference of Mayors Forum on Title VI in Detroit, Michigan” (July), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/html-doc/confmayo.htm. 
8Although not discussed in this paper, state, regional, and international use of market-based environmental 
policy instruments also increased in the 1990s (Stavins 2001). 
9The term “major environmental statutes” in this paper refers to the following Federal laws (and all 
amendments thereto): the Clean Air Act (CAA); Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act, 
CWA); Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act 
(FIFRA); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA); Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA); and Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA).  The major statutes 
alternately “forbid, inhibit, tolerate, allow, invite, or require the use of economic analysis in environmental 
decision making” (Morgenstern 1997b).  For an earlier treatment of the role of economic analysis in 
environmental regulation, see Fraas (1991).   8
the Clinton years by a mixed record of political and administrative integration of 
economic analysis within EPA.  Although EPA is constrained from using the economic 
efficiency criterion within certain dimensions of environmental policy, there is a good 
deal of flexibility in the extent to which economic analysis influences EPA processes and 
decisions.  As a result, the use of economic analysis has varied substantially from one 
administration to another.  This variance can be directly observed as changes in the 
channels through which economic advice reaches the Administrator and other decision 
makers, and indirectly as shifts in agency “culture”—broadly, the level of acceptance of 
economic advice as a valid contributor to Agency decision making. 
2.1.4.1 Historic Role of Economics at EPA 
  The channels through which economic advice historically has reached the EPA 
Administrator have been threefold:  (1) passive applied economic analysis; (2) economic 
guidance, benefit studies, and computable general equilibrium modeling; and (3) 
economic policy advising (Stavins 2000).  The RIAs and Regulatory Flexibility Analyses 
mandated by Executive Order and legislation throughout the 1980s and 1990s fall within 
the first category, passive applied analysis.  EPA routinely performs benefit-cost analyses 
of major rules, and limits most of its economic analyses to cost-effectiveness and 
distributional analyses, as required by statute.  The second category includes studies and 
advice generated by the core economics staff at EPA, which has been housed in an 
assortment of administrative entities since 1980, as described in Table 1.  The third 
category includes advising by economists internal and external to the Agency. 
  The background against which economic advice generated through these channels 
is evaluated is the culture of EPA, which historically has found the goal of economic 
efficiency tolerable, at best (Morgenstern 1997b).   Aversion to economic analysis within 
EPA is not surprising, given:  the agency mandate to protect human health and the 
environment through the Administration of the major statutes; the constraints on 
economic analysis inherent to many of those statutes; and the relatively thin 
representation of economists within most EPA offices, particularly at the level of the 
Senior Executive Service.
10  Despite their minority status, relative to lawyers, scientists, 
                                                 
10See Morgenstern (1997b).  Of the 196 EPA Senior Executive Service members with graduate degrees in 
1996, only four (2 percent) held graduate economics degrees; in contrast, almost one-third held law   9
and engineers, EPA employs more economists working on environmental issues than any 
other single institution (Morgenstern 1997b).  The extent to which economic analysis 
influences regulatory policy, however, depends critically on Agency culture and on the 
extent to which the Administrator and others are receptive to such analysis.  Without 
support within the Agency, economic analysis moving through the channels described 
will have little effect. 
2.1.4.2 Changes in the Role of Economics at EPA During the 1990s 
  Significant changes in the role of economics at EPA, both in terms of channels of 
influence and the culture of acceptance, occurred during the 1990s:  (1) during the 
Clinton years, economics had to “fight harder for its place at the table” than it had at EPA 
during the prior Bush Administration; and (2) when it did have a place at the table, 
economic analysis was more likely to be focused on increasing the cost-effectiveness of 
regulations than on weighing benefits against costs (Morgenstern 1997b, Nichols 1997). 
  Given the increase in requirements for and attention to benefit-cost analysis by 
Congress during the 1990s, EPA probably was required to perform more passive applied 
economic analysis during the 1990s than at any other time in its 30-year history.  While 
these analyses satisfied internal and external requirements, they were not done to provide 
economic information to key Agency decision makers. 
  The organizational influence (and location) of the “economics policy shop” at 
EPA changed significantly during the Clinton years.  When the Clinton Administration 
took office in 1992, the core economics staff at EPA was located within the Office of 
Policy, Planning, and Evaluation (OPPE), as  it had been since at least 1980.  OPPE 
reviewed all draft regulations and provided the Administrator with an independent 
economic perspective, which could be quite different from program office analyses.
11  
Within weeks of the Clinton inauguration, however, this role was eliminated, and 
economic analyses were rarely forwarded to Administrator Carol Browner during her 
eight-year tenure.  The substantive role of economic analysis in the development and 
                                                                                                                                                 
degrees, and one-fifth held graduate science degrees. Between 1996 and 2000, the percent of EPA 
employees with graduate degrees who held either masters or doctoral degrees in economics increased by 15 
percent, compared to a 7.7 percent overall increase in EPA employees with graduate degrees (Morgenstern 
2000).   10
review of EPA regulations was abandoned by the Agency in 1995, when the program 
offices, rather than the Administrator, became the “clients” of these analyses 
(Morgenstern 2000).  In 1999, OPPE was eliminated , shifting the core economics staff to 
a new Office of Policy and Reinvention. 
  Policy advising by economists external to the Agency was active during the 
1990s.  Deputy Administrator Fred Hansen worked closely with the Environmental 
Economics Advisory Committee (EEAC) within EPA’s Science Advisory Board to 
develop an aggressive mission statement for EEAC that focused on giving expert advice 
on broad issues of importance to the Agency, rather than simply carrying out end-of-pipe 
reviews of agency RIAs.
12  Projects executed by the EEAC during the 1990s included:  
(1) the first comprehensive review and revision in 15 years of EPA’s Economic Analysis 
Guidelines; (2) a thorough review of EPA’s methodology for valuing reductions in 
cancer-induced mortality; and (3) the reinstatement of the Pollution Abatement Cost and 
Expenditure survey.  External economists also served on the Advisory Council on Clean 
Air Act Compliance, required under the 1990 Clean Air Act (CAA) Amendments to 
provide technical and economic input on EPA’s benefit-cost analyses of CAA impacts.  
The Council had a major impact on the identification of key research issues and the 
treatment of uncertainty in these analyses (Morgenstern 2000). 
  While most of the channels for economic policy analysis at EPA remained fairly 
active during the 1990s, the “cultural acceptance” of economic analysis of environmental 
regulations was almost certainly lowered (Morgenstern 1997b).  Administrator Browner 
was skeptical, indeed dismissive of economics as an appropriate framework for 
environmental decisions.  In her remarks in honor of the 30
th anniversary of the first 
Earth Day, she commented on the establishment of the EPA, and recalled that “the nation 
committed itself to the task of eliminating pollution, to restoring our lands and waters to 
their uses, and to protecting public health without regard to cost.  Let me repeat those last 
four words––without regard to cost” (Browner 2000).  The Administrator went on to 
refer to the introduction of benefit-cost analysis into EPA regulations intended to protect 
                                                                                                                                                 
11This practice was especially active under Administrator William Reilly, 1988-1992, who regularly sought 
the opinion of the economics staff. 
12The Environmental Economics Advisory Committee was established by the Science Advisory Board in 
1990.   11
public health as “poisoning the well”.
13  The reduction in acceptance of economic 
analysis at EPA was likely influenced by Vice President Albert Gore, who was known to 
be deeply skeptical about the application of benefit-cost analysis to environmental policy 
(Gore 1992).  Thus, while requirements for regulatory benefit-cost analysis expanded in 
the 1990s, policy makers’ receptiveness to benefit-cost analysis at EPA declined 
significantly. 
  Efficiency analysis was much more controversial under Clinton’s EPA than under 
the earlier Bush Administration, but EPA’s interest in cost-effectiveness (in particular, 
the use of market-based instruments) and distributional analysis continued to grow.  In 
the same Earth Day speech that was critical of benefit-cost analysis, Administrator 
Browner took pride in highlighting EPA’s cost-effective regulatory measures and flexible 
approaches to pollution reduction (Browner 2000).  
2.1.4.3 EPA and Reinventing Government 
  Although Administrator Browner announced the creation of EPA’s Office of 
Reinvention  in 1997, efforts to reform processes at EPA had been underway since the 
mid-1980s, when Administrator Lee Thomas asked the Agency to manage its resources 
and activities to:  (1) account for relative risks; (2) recognize the cross-media nature of 
environmental problems; and (3) achieve measurable environmental results.  Vice 
President Gore’s National Performance Review Report and the Government Performance 
and Results Act of 1993 brought increased attention to these issues at EPA, and the 
agency launched the centerpiece of its “reinvention” program, the Common Sense 
Initiative (CSI) in 1994.
14  
  Each of the CSI goals can be considered within the umbrella of cost-effectiveness, 
but it is unclear whether the CSI improved the cost-effectiveness of  environmental 
                                                 
13Although she referred to benefit-cost analysis, what Administrator Browner described was m ore like a 
strict benefit-cost test that would disallow rules unless quantified benefits outweighed costs.  The influence 
of Administrator Browner’s views on economic analysis was particularly important during the Clinton 
Administration, given her eight-year tenure in the position.  The next-longest-serving EPA Administrators, 
William Reilly and Lee Thomas, each served four years. 
14Other organizations and institutions may also have played a role in EPA’s focus on reinvention.  A 1995 
National Academy of Public Administration report suggested reforms at EPA, including better use of risk 
and cost information to rank priorities.  In 1996, the Center for Strategic and International Studies launched 
“Enterprise for the Environment,” an effort to build consensus for systematic environmental management 
reform.  And the regulatory reform focus of the 104
th Congress may also have prompted EPA to attempt to 
demonstrate reform efforts, in part to forestall Congressionally mandated changes (Copeland 1996).   12
regulation in the 1990s. The CSI engaged six major industries in dialogue with EPA with 
the purpose of reducing compliance costs, introducing flexibility into regulatory 
instruments (in particular, moving toward regulation by industry, rather than by 
pollutant), and reducing costly litigation through stakeholder participation.
15  But in 1997, 
two GAO reports found that too many CSI resources had been spent on process issues, 
and too few on substance and tangible results.  In addition, progress had been limited by 
the inability of the individual industry workgroups to reach consensus, especially on the 
most important issues, and the effort lacked results-oriented measures to assess progress.  
(U.S. General Accounting Office 1997a, 1997b) 
  In 1995, Vice President Gore and Administrator Browner announced a set of 25 
specific reinvention reforms at EPA, in addition to CSI.  One of these new programs was 
Project XL (“Excellence and Leadership”), which set a goal of 50 pilot projects allowing 
regulated firms to propose alternatives to existing command-and-control regulations that 
would attain higher levels of pollution control at lower cost. The National Environmental 
Performance Partnership System sought to give states greater flexibility in achieving 
environmental goals by allowing them to convert some types of categorical Federal 
grants into more flexible block grants. Criticisms of these and many other parts of EPA’s 
reinvention program were similar to criticisms of CSI, but they included another 
important factor.  The GAO report noted that EPA’s effort could have only limited 
success in introducing cost-effective changes into processes like permitting and grant 
awards to the states, given that the major statutes regulate by environmental medium or 
by pollutant.  Substantial progress would, therefore, depend on reform of the legislative 
framework for environmental protection, rather than process reforms within EPA.  In 
addition, the GAO noted a lack of “buy in” among Agency staff accustomed to traditional 
medium-by-medium regulations.
16  The GAO report also noted confusion among 
                                                 
15The participating industries were auto manufacturing, computers and electronics, iron and steel, metal 
finishing, petroleum refining, and printing. 
16Agency staff may not have been the only ones reluctant to “buy into” this shift in regulatory focus — the 
public and environmental organizations were nervous, as well.  A report in the Boston Globe criticized the 
New England regional EPA office for embracing the national movement to “combine enforcement with 
‘compliance assistance’, a program whereby [EPA] tells companies what they should be doing and allows 
them to voluntarily fix pollution problems to avoid penalties”.  The journalist interviewed a number of EPA 
regional enforcement officials, who felt that the Agency’s new collaborative approach meant that it had 
“become subservient to business, sending a dangerous message to polluters that penalties can be avoided.” 
See Armstrong, David (1999), “U.S. Lagging on Prosecutions”, The Boston Globe (16 November): A01.   13
stakeholders due to the large number of diffuse initiatives started under the banner of 
reinvention (U.S. General Accounting Office 1997a).
17 
2.1.4.4 Death and Resurrection of the PACE Survey 
  While the 103
rd and 104
th Congresses were increasing the efficiency and cost-
effectiveness analysis responsibilities of Federal agencies, one vital source of information 
on the costs of environmental regulation was being disassembled.  The U.S. Bureau of 
the Census conducted the annual Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) 
survey from 1979 to 1994 but suspended it in 1995 for budgetary reasons.   
  The PACE database comprised operating and capital expenditures on pollution 
abatement from all manufacturing plants with more than 20 employees, selected electric 
and gas utilities, and some petroleum companies.  Despite questions about the survey’s 
comprehensiveness and reliability, it had been the primary data source of its kind for 
industry, government, and the research community.  EPA itself used PACE data in many 
RIAs and in broad efficiency and cost-effectiveness analyses, including the  Cost of 
Clean, the Section 812 retrospective benefit-cost analysis of the Clean Air Act, and 
sector-specific studies. 
  In 1998, the Environmental Economics Advisory Committee urged that the PACE 
survey be reinstated.  Two months later, Assistant Administrator for Policy, Planning, 
and Evaluation David Gardiner announced EPA’s support for reinstating the PACE 
program and pledged significant funding to make it happen, citing EEAC’s arguments 
and support as critical to the decision (Gardiner 1999). With financial and technical 
support from EPA, the Bureau of the Census requested that OMB reinstate funds for 
PACE in February 2000, noting that the survey was “essential for monitoring impact of 
environmental programs on the U.S. economy and responsiveness to these programs” 
(U.S. Department of Commerce 2000).  The survey was reinstated, with revisions, after a 
five-year hiatus. 
 
                                                 
17Appendix I of the GAO’s broad report on EPA reinvention efforts lists all reinvention programs––the list 
is almost three pages long (U.S. General Accounting Office 1997a).  Larger programs include the CSI, 
Project XL, permitting reform, and the National Environmental Performance Partnership System focused 
on EPA’s relationship with the states.   14
2.2  Congressional Initiatives 
  Environmental regulation emerged as a major target of the Congressional 
regulatory reform effort of the 1990s. This is not surprising, given that EPA is the source 
of most of the major rules  subjected to Regulatory Impact Analysis under the various 
benefit-cost Executive Orders, as measured by their estimated benefits and costs.
18 We 
discuss both comprehensive and specific regulatory reform proposals considered by the 
103
rd through 106
th Congresses. Brief summaries of regulatory reform initiatives of the 
Congresses of the 1990s that would have influenced the application of efficiency, risk 
analysis, or cost-effectiveness criteria to environmental regulation are provided in Table 
2. 
2.2.1  General Themes of Regulatory Reform Proposals   
  The 103
rd Congress (1993-1995), the Clinton Administration’s first legislative 
“partner,” actively debated benefit-cost analysis and risk analysis as methods for 
informing environmental protection decisions (Blodgett 1995, Lee 1995).  Three of the 
lightning rods for regulatory relief interests were “takings” issues or private property 
rights, unfunded mandates, and risk analysis, all of which are prominent aspects of 
environmental regulation (Lee 1995). With Democratic majorities in both houses, none of 
the 103
rd Congress’ initiatives (listed in Table 2) were enacted into law, or even offered 
for Presidential signature.  
  The regulatory reform movement gained momentum when the members of the 
104
th Congress (1995-1997) took their seats after the 1994 midterm election, in which the 
Republican Party gained control of both the Senate and the House of Representatives.  
Reform-oriented bills in 1995-1996 included mandates for benefit-cost analysis, 
maximum likelihood risk assessments (rather than upper bounds), and regulatory process 
reforms (Viscusi 1996).  Under this last category, process reforms, Congress considered 
requiring regulatory agencies to: (1) prepare special plans and analyses; (2) report to 
Congress on priority-setting and/or benefit-cost analysis; (3) submit rules for peer review 
by panels of scientific experts; and (4) submit rules for judicial review.  
                                                 
18Fifty-four percent of the total annual regulatory benefits and 50 percent of the total annual regulatory 
costs identified by OMB in 1997 were attributed to environmental regulations (Dudley and Antonelli 1997, 
Office of Management and Budget 1997).   15
2.2.2  Comprehensive Regulatory Reform: The Contract with America 
  Most of the 104
th Congress’ comprehensive regulatory reform proposals either 
failed to pass both Houses or were vetoed by President Clinton.  The 1994 Contract with 
America’s item 8, the “Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act,” did not pass as 
legislation.  It would have made Reagan’s Executive Order 12291 statutory, superseding 
the Clinton Executive Order—as well as the language in several other important 
statutes—and would have required that the benefits of regulations outweigh their costs.
19  
Although these components of the Contract with America did not become law, the 
Contract itself was a major political event, symbolic of the shift in power in the Congress 
and a consequential public debate over regulatory reform, in which benefit-cost analysis 
was a central issue. 
2.2.3  Specific Regulatory Reform Proposals   
  The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act  (SBREFA, P.L. 104-
121) amended the 1980 Regulatory Flexibility Act.  As one of the affected agencies, EPA 
must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis of all rules with “significant economic 
impact” on a “substantial number” of small entities (businesses, non-profits, and small 
government organizations).  These analyses, which must be reviewed by Congress, 
examine the type and number of small entities potentially subject to the rule, record-
keeping and compliance requirements, and significant regulatory alternatives.  The statute 
does not require formal benefit-cost analysis beyond that already required by 
environmental regulations and Executive Order; rather, it requires that EPA submit to 
Congress “a complete copy of the benefit-cost analysis of the rule, if any,” along with the 
regulatory flexibility analysis.  From an economic efficiency perspective, the focus on 
small entities makes little, if any sense, and the SBREFA requirements were viewed by 
EPA staff as little more than a time-consuming diversion from more important analyses 
and other activities. 
                                                 
19Item 8 also focused on the reduction of so-called “unfunded mandates,” and on strengthening the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, which resulted in the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness 
Act of 1996 and the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995.  There were many other unsuccessful 
attempts at regulatory reform legislation during the 104
th Congress, including H.R.1022, “Risk Assessment 
and Cost-Benefit Act of 1995"; H.J.Res. 27 and 54, which proposed a Constitutional amendment to ban 
unfunded mandates; H.R. 47, “Regulatory Relief and Reform Act”; and H.R. 122 to establish a Regulatory   16
  Embedded within SBREFA, but for the most part unrelated to its other provisions, 
was the Congressional Review Act, which established a process of Congressional review 
and possible rejection of agency rules.  Agencies must submit all new rules to the House 
and Senate leadership, in addition to the GAO.  Within 15 days, GAO must provide a 
report on each major rule to the agency's authorizing committee, after which any member 
of Congress may introduce a “resolution of disapproval,” which is treated as a bill in the 
House and somewhat differently in the Senate.  Congress then has 60 session days in 
which to act on the measure; if the resolution of disapproval passes both houses, it must 
be signed by the President in order to lead to rejection of the given rule.
20 
  In 1995, the 104
th Congress enacted the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (P.L. 
1044), which requires quantitative assessment of benefits and comparison of benefits to 
costs for all proposed and final rules, including environmental regulations, with an 
expected cost to state, local and tribal governments, or to the private sector, greater than 
or equal to $100 million.  In addition, the Act mandates that agencies choose the least-
cost regulatory alternative, or explain why the least-cost alternative was not chosen, and 
that they submit rules to the GAO, which reports to appropriate Congressional 
committees on agency compliance with statutory and executive order requirements. 
  In late 1996, the 104
th Congress attached a benefit-cost requirement to Section 
645(a) of the Treasury, Postal Services and General Government Appropriations Act of 
1997 (P.L. 104-208).
21  The Office of  Management and Budget  would be required to 
submit to Congress a report estimating the “total annual costs and benefits of Federal 
regulatory programs, including quantitative and non-quantitative measures.”  The 
legislation also required OMB to estimate individually the benefits and costs of rules with 
annual costs to the economy of $100 million or more.  Importantly, OMB also was 
required to recommend the reform or elimination of any regulation that appeared to be 
inefficient.  This reporting requirement has remained in place, and reports were submitted 
                                                                                                                                                 
Sunset Commission.  Detailed discussion of these is beyond the scope of this study.  We mention them only 
to emphasize the scope and depth of the 104
th Congress’ focus on regulatory reform. 
20The Congressional Review Act was the basis for the George W. Bush Administration’s overturning of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s ergonomics rule in 2001.  The CRA has not been used to 
reject any environmental regulations. 
21This provision was typically referred to as “regulatory accounting.”   17
in each year, 1997 through 2000.
22  The requirement has further centralized regulatory 
oversight in the hands of OMB, which already had been charged with reviewing the RIAs 
required by Executive Orders since 1981. 
  Although the benefit-cost and cost-effectiveness legislation promulgated by the 
104
th Congress had a limited effect on agency rule-making, Congressional regulatory 
reform efforts continued through the end of the Clinton Administration.  The 105
th and 
106
th Congresses considered establishing further checks on agency regulation.  The 
Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999 (also known as the Thompson-Levin bill) would 
have allowed courts to remand or invalidate rules formulated by an agency that fails to 
perform sufficient benefit-cost analysis.
23  While this bill never became law, the 106
th 
Congress did pass a major piece of regulatory reform legislation, the Truth in Regulating 
Act (TIRA), which was signed into law (P.L. 106-312) by President Clinton in October 
2000.  The TIRA established a three-year pilot project beginning in early 2001 in which 
GAO will review RIAs to evaluate agencies’ benefit estimates, cost estimates, and 
analysis of alternative approaches, upon request by Congress.
24 
 
III. Economics and Specific Environmental Policies of the 1990s 
 
  One major challenge of summarizing the most important environmental policy 
developments of the 1990s from an economic perspective is that the subset of 
environmental policies for w hich efficiency and cost-effectiveness analyses exist is 
relatively small.  In addition, many important environmental policy developments may 
not be important economic developments, and vice-versa.  The set of specific policies we 
analyze is a mixture of the most important environmental developments, and the most 
                                                 
22The continuation of this provision was proposed by the Regulatory Right-to-Know Act of 1999 (S. 59). 
Introduced as H.R. 1074 in the House, the bill would have required much more stringent analysis by OMB: 
an annual accounting statement of total costs and benefits of Federal regulations, including direct and 
indirect impacts on Federal, state, local and tribal government, the private sector, small business, wages, 
and economic growth. 
23The Regulatory Improvement Act was proposed as S. 981 in 1997 and carried on with the same title into 
1998.  It was introduced in various versions in both Houses of Congress throughout 1997-1999, and took 
on the Thompson-Levin moniker in May 1999.  A similar bill was introduced in the House in late 1999, but 
without the judicial review mandate. 
24The initiation of GAO review under TIRA is contingent on appropriations.  As of May 2001, funding had 
not been authorized.   18
important applications of economic analysis and market-based instruments to 
environmental policy.  The intersection of these two sets is small. 
  We consider Clinton era statutes and regulations that focused on specific 
environmental problems under five principal categories:  Congressional changes to 
individual environmental statutes (including the Safe Drinking Water Act amendments of 
1996 and the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996); implementation of the Clean Air Act 
amendments of 1990 (including new national ambient air quality standards for ozone and 
particulates, SO2 allowance trading, new air toxics regulation, and the regional NOx 
trading program); expansion of information-based regulatory programs; natural resource 
policy initiatives; and global climate change initiatives. 
3.1  Congressional Changes to Individual Environmental Statutes 
  In addition to their attempts at cross-cutting regulatory reform, the Congresses of 
the Clinton years pursued efficiency and cost-effectiveness within environmental statutes 
themselves.
25  In general, the Congress was more successful during the 1990s at passing 
cross-cutting regulatory reform bills than it was at reforming individual environmental 
statutes, although important exceptions were the 1996 Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) 
amendments, and the partial reform of pesticide permitting under the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
(FFDCA).  The 104
th Congress also pursued efficiency-oriented reform of the Clean 
Water Act through the reauthorization process, but the effort failed in the Senate.  All 
efforts to reform the  Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act (CERCLA) failed, as did attempts to reform the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA) and other statutes.  
3.1.1  Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996 
  The 1996 SDWA Amendments (P.L. 104-182) included the most far-reaching 
requirement for economic analysis in any environmental statute.  The Amendments 
focused EPA regulatory efforts on contaminants that pose the greatest health risks by:  (1) 
                                                 
25During the 1990s, the Congress also pursued reforms of non-environmental statutes that affect 
environmental regulation.  For example, the Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of 1996 
(104
th Congress) requires the Secretary of Transportation to issue pipeline safety regulations only upon   19
requiring benefit-cost analysis of new rules; (2) removing the mandate that EPA regulate 
25 new contaminants every three years; (3) allowing EPA to use cost information to 
adjust its “feasibility standards” for water system reduction of contaminants; and (4) 
requiring the Administrator to balance risks among contaminants to minimize the overall 
risk of adverse health effects (Tiemann 1999).  While the Amendments require EPA to 
determine whether the benefits of each new drinking water maximum contaminant level 
(MCL) regulation justify the costs, they also allow the Agency to adopt more stringent 
standards than those that maximize net benefits,  explaining the reasons for not selecting 
the efficient standard.
26   
  The decisions made on MCLs since the SDWA Amendments have not placed 
great weight on the results of required benefit-cost analyses.  Two major rules proposed 
since the 1996 Amendments are those regulating allowable levels of arsenic and radon in 
drinking water.  The arsenic rule was finalized on January 22, 2001 but is under review 
by the George W. Bush Administration, while no final action was taken on radon.
27  
EPA’s benefit-cost analysis for the radon and arsenic MCLs can be interpreted as 
indicating that monetized costs exceed monetized benefits for both rules (by more than 
$50 million annually for radon and $30 million annually for arsenic).  The Agency 
maintained, however, that benefits of both rules justify their costs when unquantified 
benefits are included (Burnett and Hahn 2001).
28  While this may be true, the fact that 
both the radon and arsenic rules result in net monetized costs has caused some to be 
skeptical of EPA’s commitment to applying the SDWA Amendments’ benefit-cost 
requirement.  Moreover, these analyses did not consider cost-effective alternatives, such 
                                                                                                                                                 
justification that benefits exceed costs (Blodgett 1998).  Discussion of these reforms is beyond the scope of 
this study, although some are listed in Table 2. 
26See Safe Drinking Water Act §300g-1 (4)(C).  The Amendments do not allow old standards to be 
subjected to an ex-post benefit-cost analysis. 
27On March 20, 2001, EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman announced the Agency’s intention to 
withdraw the pending arsenic standard in order to seek independent reviews of both the science behind the 
standard and the estimates of the benefits and costs of implementing the rule. In May, 2001, the 
Administrator announced that the National Academy of Sciences will review a range of possible arsenic 
standards, and that the effective date of the standard will be postponed until February 2002. 
28See Environmental Protection Agency (1999a). EPA’s cost and benefit figures for these rules were 
presented as annualized 1999 dollar values using a 7 percent discount rate.  The AEI-Brookings Joint 
Center for Regulatory Analysis performed its own benefit-cost analysis of the arsenic rule, which concludes 
that in all likely scenarios the cost per life saved by the rule would never be less than $6.6 million, and that 
in its “most likely” scenario, cost per life saved was approximately $67 million.  See Burnett and Hahn 
(2001).   20
as limiting compliance to large public drinking water systems.  The actual benefit-cost 
analyses themselves also suffer from methodological flaws, such as not discounting for 
latency in the case of arsenic-related human health effects. 
  There will be more rulemakings under the SDWA over the next decade–  in 1998  
EPA published a list of 50 chemical and ten microbiological contaminants that will be 
investigated for possible regulation. The impact of the SDWA Amendments’ requirement 
for benefit-cost analysis in deciding both which drinking water contaminants to regulate 
and how to regulate them will be an important area for further research. 
3.1.2  Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 
  The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-170) amends both FIFRA and 
the FFDCA, removing pesticide residues on processed food from the group of Delaney 
“zero-risk standard” substances.  The Delaney standard has long been a target of 
economic criticism. While the standard continues to apply to non-pesticide food 
additives, the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 eliminated the distinction between 
pesticide residues on raw foods (which had been regulated under FFDCA section 408) 
and processed foods (which had been regulated under FFDCA section 409––the Delaney 
Clause).  The Act also mandates that EPA coordinate pesticide regulation under FIFRA 
and FFDCA.
29  
3.1.3  Debates Over Changes to Superfund and Clean Water Act 
  Two of the environmental statutes most frequently criticized on efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness grounds — Superfund and the Clean Water Act (CWA) — remained 
relatively untouched by the Congress in the 1990s, despite its focus on regulatory reform.  
Superfund’s critics have focused on the low benefits for dollars spent (Viscusi 1992, 
Breyer 1993, Hamilton and Viscusi 1999).  Reauthorization and reform were considered 
during the 105
th Congress, but no legislation was passed. Rather than efficiency or cost-
effectiveness, liability issues and the question of how to finance Superfund in the future 
were the major foci of legislative discussion of this statute in the late 1990s.  The taxes 
that support the Superfund trust fund (primarily excise taxes on petroleum and specified 
                                                 
29For example, once a pesticide registration is canceled under FIFRA, the food-use tolerance under FFDCA 
must be revoked within 180 days, rather than the average six year time frame noted in a 1994 GAO report 
(Schierow 1996, U.S. General Accounting Office 1994).   21
chemical feedstocks and a corporate environmental income tax) expired in 1995 and have 
not been reinstated.
30 
  During the 104
th Congress, the House passed a comprehensive Clean Water Act 
reauthorization (H.R. 961) that would have been more flexible and less prescriptive than 
the current statute, but the Senate did not take up the bill.
31  No reauthorization legislation 
was considered in the 105
th or 106
th Congress, but the legislature did oppose non-point 
source water pollution control initiatives under Section 303(d). 
  Section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act requires states to establish a Total 
Maximum Daily Load (TMDL), something like a “pollution budget”, for each water body 
that does not meet ambient water quality standards for its designated use, despite point 
source pollution control.
32  Until recently, EPA did little to enforce this part of the CWA, 
but state courts ordered the development of TMDLs in the 1990s in response to multiple 
lawsuits by environmental groups.
33   
  EPA convened a Federal advisory committee to develop a consistent national 
TMDL program in 1996, proposed regulations to clarify and strengthen the TMDL 
program in August 1999, and issued a final rule in July 2000.  The proposed and final 
rule generated controversy over the costs of state implementation of TMDLs and about 
their impact on agriculture and forestry.  As a result, the 104
th Congress attached a rider 
to an appropriations bill that prevents EPA from spending funds to implement the rule in 
FY2000 and FY2001.  Should states be required to fully enforce TMDLs, the economic 
implications are likely to be very large — the most current list of impaired waters under 
Section 303(d), which would be subject to TMDL enforcement, includes almost 22,000 
water bodies.  
                                                 
30The revenues now flowing into the trust fund come from so-called “potentially responsible parties”, 
interest on the fund’s investments, fines, and penalties. House Ways and Means Chairman Bill Archer (R-
TX) has made it known that no reinstatement of the Superfund taxes will be considered without major 
reforms of the statute’s liability provisions and other features. See Reisch (2000).   
31The 103
rd Congress had considered similar legislation (H.R. 3948, S. 2093), but no floor action on CWA 
reauthorization was taken in either house. 
32The TMDL should be set at a level necessary to attain the applicable water quality standard for the water 
body’s designated use.  Designated uses include recreational use, public water supply, and industrial water 
supply, for example, and each designated use has an applicable water quality standard.   
33Through October 2000, environmental groups had filed 40 legal actions in 38 states.  EPA is under court 
order or consent decree in many states to ensure that TMDLs are established either by the state or by EPA 
itself (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water 2000).   22
  The TMDL program takes an ambient approach to water quality regulation and 
emphasizes watershed-level water quality trading over the traditional technology 
standards promulgated under the CWA’s National P ollutant Discharge Elimination 
System permits.  Both of these would be welcome changes to traditional water quality 
regulation from an economic perspective, but it is very difficult to link particular sources 
to ambient water quality.  In addition, attaining the TMDL generally involves regulating 
non-point source pollution, given that point-source permitting has been insufficient to 
achieve compliance with water quality standards.  Identification of the sources and 
pathways of pollution in compiling a TMDL requires a “kind of holistic accounting 
exercise” in which all permitted sources and land uses within a waterbody’s drainage area 
are inventoried and allocated portions of the pollution budget (Boyd 2000).
34   In 
addition, while the theoretical economic gains from point-nonpoint source water quality 
trading could be substantial, the number of actual trades under the 15 current and past 
Federal and state water quality trading programs has been negligible (Boyd 2000, Stavins 
2001). 
  From a cost-effectiveness  standpoint, the focus on nonpoint sources is 
theoretically sound; there is no reason, ex ante, to impose further restrictions on point 
sources merely because the legal, technical, and institutional bases for regulating 
nonpoint sources are murky.  Recognition is widespread that nonpoint sources of 
pollution are of greater concern, for most of the nation’s impaired water bodies, than 
permitted point sources from which reductions have been achieved over 25 years (see 
Table 3).  The potentially high costs of establishing, monitoring, and enforcing pollution 
budgets for non-point sources, however, may offset any gains we could expect to achieve 
from bringing the marginal abatement costs of point and non-point sources into closer 
alignment. 
 3.2  Implementation of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments 
  A substantial portion of air quality regulation during the 1990s had to do with 
implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.  While the judiciary in the 
                                                 
34In addition, data sources and modeling techniques can be standardized only to a very small degree, since 
each listed water body (lakes, river segments, ponds, estuaries) has unique hydrology, transport pathways, 
pollutant sources, weather patterns, etc.  See Boyd (2000).    23
1990s  and subsequently upheld CAA statutory provisions preventing EPA from taking 
costs into account when setting the National Ambient Air Quality Standards, the 1990 
Amendments addressed efficiency and cost-effectiveness of air quality regulations in a 
variety of ways.
35  First, the Amendments required a retrospective benefit-cost analysis of 
the 1970 CAA and its 1977 amendments, and biennial prospective analyses of the 1990 
Amendments themselves.  The results of these benefit-cost analyses are discussed in 
Section 4.3.1, where we consider the efficiency of the major environmental statutes.  
  In addition, although they did not allow for the consideration of costs in setting 
ambient standards, the Amendments occasionally provided the basis for implementation 
of cost-effective regulation.  For example, under Title IV of the amendments, Congress 
directed EPA not to mandate specific pollution control technologies for sulfur dioxide 
(SO2) emissions from power plants, while it required the agency to o versee SO2 
emissions reduction from these sources by nearly 50 percent over 10 years.  The result 
was the SO2 permit trading system.  Not all regulations promulgated under the 1990 CAA 
Amendments were equally as cost-effective, however.  The Amendments explicitly 
required EPA to issue technology standards for 188 toxic air pollutants, perhaps one of 
the most expensive and least cost-effective components of the CAA (Portney 1990).  
Highlights of the implementation of the 1990 CAA Amendments, from an economic 
perspective, are discussed below. 
3.2.1  Use of Market-Based Instruments in Clean Air Act Amendment Implementation\ 
  EPA provided averaging, banking, and trading opportunities for most of the new 
standards promulgated under the direction of the 1990 CAA Amendments, including 
those aimed at mobile sources.  EPA’s implementation of the reformulated gasoline 
provisions of Title II of the Amendments allowed refinery-level trading of oxygen, 
aromatics, and benzene content.
36  Title II also authorized EPA to regulate particulate 
matter, nitrogen oxide (NOx), and other emissions from heavy-duty trucks.  The resulting 
regulations were promulgated at the vehicle engine-manufacturing level, and allow 
                                                 
35See U.S. Supreme Court (2001a); the 2001 decision regarding the National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards is discussed further in section 3.2.4. 
36The initial guidance for the reformulated gasoline trading programs was issued in October 1992, during 
the Bush Administration. Trading at the refinery level has been very active (U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency 2001a).    24
averaging, banking, and trading.
37 The Tier 2 emissions standards for cars and light-duty 
trucks, issued in February 2000, allow vehicle manufacturers to average NOx emissions 
throughout their fleets to meet the new national tailpipe standards.  They also allow 
refiners and gasoline importers to average, bank, and trade gasoline sulfur content to 
meet new Tier 2 standards.
38  
  With respect to stationary sources, the regional NOx cap-and-trade program in the 
Northeast is another significant market-based policy instrument developed and 
implemented under the aegis of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.  Although the SO2 
trading program was created under the Bush Administration, implementation of Phase I 
and Phase II occurred during the 1990s and is one of the world’s most frequently studied 
market-based instrument for environmental policy.  These two programs are described 
below, as are two significant rulemakings that have been more heavily criticized from an 
economic perspective:  the revised ambient air quality standards for ozone and particulate 
matter, and new regulations on toxic air pollutants.   
3.2.2  Sulfur Dioxide Trading Phase I and Phase II 
  The tradeable permit system that regulates SO2 emissions, the primary precursor 
of acid rain, was established under Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.  
The system is intended to reduce SO2 and NOx emissions from 1980 levels by 10 million 
tons and 2 million tons, respectively.
39  The first phase of SO2 emissions reductions was 
started in 1995, with a second phase of reduction initiated in the year 2000.
40 
  A robust market of bilateral SO2 permit trading emerged in the 1990s, resulting in 
cost savings on the order of $1 billion annually, compared with the costs under some 
command-and-control regulatory alternatives (Carlson  et al. 2000).  Although the 
program had low levels of trading in its early years (Burtraw 1996), trading levels 
                                                 
37While a great deal of averaging and banking has taken place, only one trade was completed through 2000 
(U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2001a). 
38The banking and trading allowances under the Tier 2 standard are limited.  The average sulfur content cap 
drops annually between 2004 and 2006, and credits produced within that time frame have a limited life, 
while credits produced after the introduction of the strictest standard (2006) have unlimited life. 
39For a description of the legislation, see Ferrall (1991). 
40In Phase I, individual emissions limits were assigned to the 263 most SO2-emissions intensive generating 
units at 110 plants operated by 61 electric utilities, and located largely at coal-fired power plants east of the 
Mississippi River. Under Phase II of the program, beginning January 1, 2000, almost all electric power 
generating units were brought within the system.   25
increased significantly over time (Schmalensee et al. 1998; Stavins 1998; Burtraw and 
Mansur 1999). 
3.2.3  Regional NOx Budget Program in the Northeast 
  Under EPA guidance, twelve northeastern states and the District of Columbia 
implemented a regional NOx cap-and-trade system in 1999 to reduce compliance costs 
associated with the Ozone Transport Commission (OTC) regulations of the 1990 CAA 
Amendments.
41  Required reductions are based on targets established by the OTC and 
include emissions reductions by large stationary sources. The program is known as the 
Northeast Ozone Transport Region (Farrell et al. 1999). 
  EPA distributes NOx allowances to each state, and states then allocate allowances 
to sources in their jurisdictions.  Each source receives allowances equal to its restricted 
percentage of 1990 emissions, and sources must turn in one allowance for each ton of 
NOx emitted over the ozone season. Sources may buy, sell, and bank allowances.  
Potential compliance cost savings of 40 to 47 percent have been estimated for the period 
1999-2003, compared to a base case of continued command-and-control regulation 
without trading or banking (Farrell et al. 1999). 
3.2.4  National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone and Particulate Matter 
  EPA issued new, stricter National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for 
ozone and particulate matter in July 1997.  The revised standards were immediately 
controversial; both the decision to tighten the standards and the quality of the research 
used to support the new standards came under fire.  Table 4 lists EPA’s estimated 
monetized benefits and costs for the revised ozone and particulate matter NAAQS.  
EPA’s cost estimates for the ozone standard were singled out for criticism; some analysts 
found them to be too low by a considerable margin (Shogren 1998, Lutter 1999). 
  The regulated community challenged the new NAAQS in the courts, and the case 
reached the U.S. Supreme Court in October 2000.  Under the Clean Air Act, EPA is 
required to set health-based standards for these pollutants and to ignore cost 
considerations in setting the standards.  More than 40 economists and the AEI-Brookings 
                                                 
41Seven OTC states have also implemented state-level NOx trading programs: New Jersey, Connecticut, 
Delaware, New York, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Maine (Solomon 1999).    26
Joint Center for Regulatory Studies filed a brief amici curiae in the Supreme Court, 
suggesting that benefit-cost analysis should be considered in the setting of ambient air 
quality standards (AEI-Brookings Joint Center et al. 2000).  The Supreme Court ruled 
unanimously in February 2001 that the CAA does not allow EPA to consider costs in 
setting NAAQS for the criteria pollutants, and that the statute’s mandate that the NAAQS 
protect the public health with “an adequate margin of safety” allows an acceptable scope 
of discretion to EPA.  The Court acknowledged that EPA and the states could continue to 
take costs into account in implementing the standards, which may serve as an impetus for 
cost-effective policy instruments.
42 
  Given that monetized costs appear to outweigh monetized benefits by a 
significant margin, EPA has been under considerable pressure to revise the ozone 
standard despite the Court’s decision on cost consideration.
43  The situation is different 
for particulate matter, where monetized benefits appear to outweigh monetized costs.  In 
any case, the NAAQS represent a clear majority of all economic effects of environmental 
policy changes during the 1990s.  Should the courts continue to uphold the standards and 
the statutes preventing cost considerations remain unchanged, the stricter NAAQS for 
ozone and particulate matter may be one of the Clinton Administration’s most enduring  
environmental legacies, in terms of both potential benefits and costs.
44 
3.2.5  Maximum Available Control Technology for Air Toxics 
  The air toxics regulations necessitated under the 1990 CAA Amendments could 
be one of the most expensive and least cost-effective components of the Clean Air Act, 
depending on how they are implemented.  The Amendments mandated that EPA issue 
standards for 188 toxic air pollutants, substances that are less common than the criteria 
                                                 
42The Supreme Court decision was greeted with enthusiasm by EPA Administrator Christine Todd 
Whitman: “...Congress delegated to EPA the standard-setting function, and EPA carried it out 
appropriately” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2001b). 
43EPA has agreed to reconsider its analysis of ozone NAAQS benefits in at least one respect; the agency’s 
initial analysis did not consider the possible damages associated with decreases in ground-level ozone, 
which leads to increases in some ultraviolet radiation (UV-B) exposure.  These damages, which include 
increases in skin cancer and cataracts, could be comparable to the benefits associated with reductions in 
ground level ozone (Lutter and Wolz 1997). 
44It remains to be seen whether some urban areas will be able to comply with the new ozone standards.  
One analyst estimates the costs to Los Angeles of meeting the ozone standard in 2010 will be about $15 
billion in constant 2000 dollars, assuming a 5 percent decrease in current abatement costs due to 
technological change (Lutter 1999).   27
pollutants for which NAAQS are promulgated, but nonetheless might pose threats to 
human health.  Like the NAAQS, the statute’s treatment of toxic air pollutants requires 
EPA to set standards so that resulting concentrations provide an “ample margin of safety” 
against human health effects.  Unlike in the case of the NAAQS, however, the 
Administrator of EPA is directed to require the maximum degree of emissions reduction 
achievable, taking costs into consideration.   
  Although EPA is allowed to take costs into account when determining standards 
for hazardous air pollutants, the type of regulation required is a technology standard — 
Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT) — not a market-based approach.  
From 1992 through August 2000, EPA issued technology standards for 45 of these 
substances, covering 82 categories of industrial sources. While there are no estimates of 
the total monetized costs and benefits of this new set of technology standards for 
hazardous air pollutants, one analyst in 1990 estimated that when fully implemented, 
compliance costs would range from $7.9 to $13.2 billion per year, and benefits would 
range from $0 to $5.3 billion per year (Portney 1990).
45  The lower bound of zero on 
potential benefits is indicative of the considerable uncertainty over risks posed by these 
pollutants to human health.  Some analysts have been particularly critical of EPA’s very 
conservative estimates of risks to human health from air toxics in its promulgation of 
standards (Stroup 2000, Gray and Graham 1991). 
3.3  Expansion of Information Programs 
  EPA increased its use of information disclosure regulations, one form of market-
based instrument for environmental policy, during the 1990s.  The Toxics Release 
Inventory (TRI) was initiated in 1988 under the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-to-Know Act Section 313 and requires firms to report on use, storage and release 
of hazardous chemicals.  A 1993 Clinton executive order required TRI reporting by 
Federal facilities.  In 1994, EPA added 286 new chemicals to the list requiring TRI 
reporting, nearly an 80 percent increase in the number of listed chemicals.  In 1999, EPA 
lowered reporting thresholds for many persistent bioaccumulative toxic chemicals and 
                                                 
45These figures were Portney’s “educated guess” in 1990, based on George H. W. Bush Administration 
estimates and those of a 1990 consulting firm study.  We have converted them to 2000 dollars, assuming 
that they were originally stated in 1990 dollars.  See Portney (1990).    28
added more of these chemicals to the TRI list.
46  The 104
th Congress considered but did 
not enact legislation that would have restricted EPA’s ability to require TRI reporting.
47 
  Releases reported under TRI declined by 45 percent from 1988 to 1998, but it is 
unclear how much, if any, of that reduction can be attributed to the policy itself.  There is 
some evidence that publicly available information about firms’ TRI emissions, either in 
absolute terms or relative to some benchmarks, negatively affects stock prices (Hamilton 
1995, Konar and Cohen 1997, Khanna et al. 1998). Other possible avenues through 
which the TRI may influence emissions are green consumerism, redirection of firms’ 
attention toward measures that increase environmental performance while saving costs, 
and community pressure, but there is currently little solid evidence that any of these 
forces are at work with respect to the TRI (Snyder 2001). 
  In addition to the Toxics Release Inventory, EPA also focused on establishing 
new and expanding other existing information programs during the 1990s. In 1997, EPA 
expanded the existing Energy Star Buildings program, consolidating it with the newer 
Green Lights program.  In 1998, the Agency began requiring public water systems to 
issue annual Drinking Water Consumer Confidence Reports.  In 2000, it posted 
automobile “pollution rankings” on the EPA web site, ranking vehicles based on 
hydrocarbon and NOx tailpipe emissions.  While these programs could, in theory, be cost-
effective ways to reach environmental objectives, we cannot conclude from existing 
empirical evidence whether they are responsible for any portion of the trends in air and 
water quality in the 1990s.  Not surprisingly, given the lack of evidence regarding the 
benefits of these programs, no formal benefit-cost analyses of TRI or any of the other 
programs mentioned above have been conducted. 
 
 
                                                 
46The EPA under Clinton also continued the 33/50 program, started under the Bush Administration, which 
engaged TRI-reporting industries in achieving voluntary accelerated emissions reduction targets in 
exchange for public “certification” and its associated goodwill. 
47The Clinton Administration announced another expansion of TRI on January 17, 2001, considerably 
lowering the threshold for reporting lead emissions.  The previous standard required reporting by facilities 
that manufacture or process more than 25,000 pounds of lead annually, or that use more than 10,000 
pounds annually.  The new standard requires reporting by any facility that manufactures, processes, or uses   29
3.4  Natural Resource Policy 
  From an economic perspective, five aspects of natural resource policy during the 
Clinton years stand out: the natural resource subsidy reductions included within the 
Administration’s 1993 economic stimulus and deficit-reduction proposal; the shift in 
priorities of the U.S. Forest Service; Clinton’s designation of almost 6 million new acres 
of Federal public lands under the 1906 Antiquities Act; changes to Federal wetlands 
policy and the Endangered Species Act; and attempts to introduce natural resource capital 
and environmental quality into the national income and product accounts.
48 
3.4.1  Natural Resources and the 1993 Clinton Budget Proposal 
  The Administration proposed a variety of policies related to natural resource 
subsidy reduction within its 1993 economic stimulus and deficit reduction proposal.  
First, it proposed increasing the baseline Federal grazing fee on public lands by almost 
200 percent, resulting in a Senate filibuster on FY1994 Interior Appropriations during the 
103
rd Congress. The baseline Federal grazing fee had been calculated at only 56 to 83 
percent of Federal costs per animal unit month in 1990 and was a much smaller 
percentage (perhaps 18 to 40 percent) of private market rates (Cody 1996).  In theory, 
below-market fees for grazing livestock on public lands cause economic over-grazing.  In 
practice, low fees have also been criticized from a budgetary perspective, since current 
fees do not cover the costs of Federal public range management.
49  
  Similarly, below-cost timber sales from Federal lands theoretically lead to logging 
at greater-than-efficient rates.  The Administration’s 1993 proposal  sought to phase out 
below-cost timber sales from Federal forests.  By U.S. Forest Service (USFS) estimates, 
                                                                                                                                                 
more than 100 pounds annually.  The Bush Administration announced its intention to uphold the new 
threshold on April 17, 2001. 
48Land use change emerged as an important issue during the 1990s and r eceived substantial rhetorical 
attention from President Clinton and, in particular, Vice President Gore.  While initiatives under this 
umbrella term could be considered as natural resource policy, most of the policies designed to address land 
use change, i ncluding those promoting “smart growth” and “livable communities” and limiting “urban 
sprawl” were related to transportation policy and other areas beyond the scope of this paper.  Land use 
change is, therefore, omitted from our discussion.   
49The baseline grazing fee for Federal lands in 1990 was $1.81 per animal unit month (AUM), while the 
various livestock grazing programs’ cost to government of ranged from $2.18 to $3.24 per AUM.  The fair 
market value of grazing on Federal land was last updated in 1986, and ranged from $4.68 to $10.26 per 
AUM for cattle and horses, varying by region (Cody 1996).  (These figures have not been converted to 
constant dollars.) The Administration continued to lobby for fee increases, and the 104
th Congress   30
77 of the 120 national forests showed net losses from timber sales over the period 
FY1989-FY1993, and 60 reported losses in every year over this period. The plan to 
reduce below-cost sales was eliminated from Clinton’s final budget proposal, however, 
and a USFS draft plan to phase out below-cost sales on one-half of forest service lands 
over four years was not adopted by the Administration.  
  The 1993 deficit reduction plan also included a British Thermal Unit (BTU) tax, 
one of the first and most visible environmental initiatives of the Clinton presidency.
50  
The proposal, which would have taxed essentially all fuels, faced stiff opposition in the 
first session of the 103
rd Congress, but it narrowly passed the House.  Recognizing that 
the proposal did not have enough votes in the Senate, the Administration removed the 
BTU tax from its budget proposal.
51  The Administration proposed another energy tax in 
1997 as part of its climate change strategy, but faced similar opposition.   
  The Administration’s focus on natural resource policy in the 1993 budget 
proposal also included introduction of royalties for hardrock mining on public lands 
governed under the 1872 General Mining Law, and increased fees for recreational use of 
Federal public lands (U.S. Council of Economic Advisers 1997).
52  The Congress 
opposed all of the natural resource initiatives in the 1993 Clinton proposal, with one 
exception––the 104
th Congress established a framework for user fee demonstration 
projects within the National Park Service (P.L. 104-134).
53  
3.4.2  U.S. Forest Service Changes 
  While the Administration’s proposed phasedown of below-cost timber sales 
failed, the Forest Service under Clinton underwent a substantial shift in priorities, 
                                                                                                                                                 
established a new fee formula that resulted in a small increase in the baseline fee, still many times lower 
than the average private market rate. 
50The tax would have been imposed on coal, natural gas, liquid petroleum gases, nuclear electricity, 
hydroelectricity, and all imported electricity (almost 3 cents per million BTU); a higher tax (about 6 cents 
per million BTU) would have been imposed on refined petroleum products. 
51The Senate later passed a much watered-down Transportation Fuels Tax in 1993, with revenues flowing 
to the General Fund.  This was a retail tax on gasoline of less than 5 cents per gallon, paid by consumers. 
52The Administration also supported electricity deregulation and agricultural subsidy reduction, but those 
initiatives are beyond the scope of this paper. 
53During the 1990s, the Congress also opposed the application of market incentives to fisheries 
management.  The Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-297) amended the Magnuson-Stevens 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act, imposing a four-year moratorium on new individual tradeable 
quota programs among the nation’s eight regional fishery management councils and repealing one such   31
emphasizing resource protection over timber production and extraction.  In two speeches 
delivered in 1998 and 1999, USFS Chief Mike Dombeck summed up these changes in the 
agency’s “Natural Resource Agenda for the 21
st Century”, emphasizing: (1) watershed 
protection; (2) sustainable forest system ecosystem management; (3) forest roads; and (4) 
recreation.
54  Prior to these statements, however, substantial changes had already been 
implemented. 
  The volume of timber sold from U.S. National Forests fell from about 11.5 billion 
board feet per year in 1987 to less than 4 billion board feet per year in 1997, a decrease of 
almost 70 percent (U.S. General Accounting Office 1999).
55 This was due, in part, to the 
increased costs to producers associated with the USFS shift to offering timber sales to 
improve forest health, rather than to provide wood fiber — most of the trees removed to 
reduce the risk of fire have little commercial value.  In addition, the USFS 1992 policy 
reducing clear-cutting in national forests dramatically increased the costs of logging, 
especially in the Pacific Northwest, which experienced per-unit cost increases of 150 
percent between 1980 and 1997 (U.S. General Accounting Office 1999).  No efficiency 
estimate exists for this aggregate policy shift, and no analysis of the potentially 
substantial environmental and recreational benefits and economic costs has been 
undertaken. 
  The Forest Service also was the focus of the Clinton Administration’s Roadless 
Initiative, hailed by environmentalists as one of the decade’s most important 
environmental policy initiatives, but perhaps less important economically than the shift 
discussed above.  President Clinton announced the Initiative in October 1999, instructing 
the USFS to develop regulations for long-term protection of inventoried roadless areas 
within the National Forest system.  The USFS Roadless Rule, submitted to the Federal 
                                                                                                                                                 
program that had been created in 1995 (Buck 1996). The Act did not, however, repeal the other five 
existing ITQ programs. 
54This change has not been driven exclusively by the Executive Branch.  Congress has increasingly 
designated portions of National Forest lands for conservation, so that about 25 percent of national forests 
were being managed for conservation by 1994.  The Endangered Species Act (ESA) has also played a role.  
The number of threatened and endangered species on National Forest system lands has risen from about 50 
to almost 350 between 1973 and 1997, and the USFS is required by Section 7 of the ESA to give greater 
priority to species protection than other missions on such lands.  See U.S. General Accounting Office 
(1999). 
55Over this same period, the number of visitor days in National Forests increased from about 225,000 to 
almost 350,000, indicating an increase in recreational benefits (U.S. General Accounting Office 1999).   32
Register in January 2001,  placed 58.5 million acres of unroaded Federal forest lands in 
39 states off limits to new roadbuilding.
56  
  The efficiency implications of this rule are unclear.  Inventoried roadless areas 
comprise two percent of the U.S. landmass and 31 percent of the forest system landmass.  
They usually are characterized by rugged terrain and low-value timber or are considered 
ecologically sensitive, however, which may suggest relatively low costs to leaving in 
them in their current state and relatively high environmental benefits of preservation.
57  In 
addition, by Forest Service calculations, less than two-tenths of one percent of the U.S. 
timber harvest  and less  than four-tenths of one percent of U.S. oil and natural gas 
reserves will be affected by the roadless rule (Dombeck 2001). Any benefit-cost 
calculation would have to take into account the cost of maintaining forest system roads.  
USFS currently maintains a road system of more than 386,000 miles, and has a 
maintenance backlog in excess of $8 billion. 
  Also in January 2001, Forest Service Chief Mike Dombeck announced a new 
USFS policy directive on old-growth cutting.  This was a substantial reversal of previous 
policy, which had promoted the cutting of the largest, oldest trees first.  The Forest 
Service estimates that the change could affect 20 percent of the U.S. timber harvest from 
national forests scheduled in the coming year, and as much as 50 percent in the forests of 
the Pacific Northwest.
58  The combined effect of these three policies––the change in 
priorities of the USFS, the Roadless Initiative, and the directive on old-growth cutting––
is that significant portions of the system of National Forests are being managed more as 
national parks.  This may well reflect a change in social preferences, but it appears to 
conflict with the System’s statutory framework, which supports management for multiple 
use (Sedjo 2000).  In addition, the distributional implications of the Forest System 
                                                 
56President George W. Bush placed a 60-day “stay” on this and all Federal rules published in the Federal 
Register and not yet in effect as of January 20, 2001. The Bush administration announced on May 4, 2001 
that it will allow the rule to take effect but will propose changes to the rule in June.  Through May 2001, six 
lawsuits had been filed challenging the roadless rule. Plaintiffs include timber companies and industry 
associations, Boise County, various off-road vehicle groups, livestock companies, the Kootenai Tribe, and 
the states of Alaska, Idaho, and Utah. 
57Clinton Forest Service Chief Mike Dombeck makes the point that these areas were the 58.5 million acres 
of Forest Reserves created between 1891 and 2000 that had remained roadless through 20 presidencies. 
58This policy directive does not have the force of law, and can be overturned at will by the USFS Chief.   33
changes have made them very controversial in Western states, which bear much of the 
costs of the shift away from extractive use.   
3.4.3  Designation of New National Monuments 
  One of the most visible natural resource policy developments of the 1990s was 
the Clinton Administration’s designation of more than 20 new  national monuments and 
expansion of three existing national monuments, under the 1906 Antiquities Act.  The 
designations and expansions gave monument status to almost 6 million acres of Federal 
public lands, restricting uses relative to prior designations.
59 Clinton also created the 
largest protected area in U.S. history, the 84 million-acre Northwest Hawaiian Islands 
Coral Reef Ecosystem Reserve.  During the 1990s, the Congress created one new 
national monument of 272,000 acres, and one national preserve (the Mojave Desert) of 
1.6 million acres. 
  Taken together, Clinton’s national monument designations constitute the largest 
withdrawal of U.S. Federal lands from commercial activity since President Jimmy Carter 
withdrew 56 million acres of Alaskan lands in 1978 (Vincent 1998).  All but one of 
Clinton’s designations were declared in the final year of his presidency, from January 
2000 to January 2001.  The unilateral, final-hour nature of the declarations raised scores 
of objections from Western legislators and property-rights activists.
60  The efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness aspects of these declarations have not been assessed; unlike rules 
issued by regulatory agencies, Presidential actions under the 1906 Antiquities Act are not 
                                                 
59A notable exception was the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR).  Clinton was lobbied heavily to 
declare the 1.5 million-acre coastal plain of ANWR a national monument, but did not make the designation.  
Environmental groups thought the designation would better protect the refuge from future oil and gas 
exploration, a possibility raised by several Congressional bills during the 1990s. The 1995 shutdown of the 
Federal government was due, in part to a budget legislation rider that would have allowed drilling in 
ANWR, which  contributed to Clinton’s veto.  In contrast, the Clinton Administration opened 4.6 million 
acres of the National Petroleum Reserve - Alaska, 23 million acres situated between the Brooks Range and 
the Arctic Ocean, to oil and gas leasing during the 1990s.  Clinton directed Interior Secretary Babbitt to 
initiate a planning process for the Reserve in 1997, and the Bureau of Land Management held an oil and 
gas lease sale for portions of the northeast corner of the Reserve in May 1999, despite the filing of a lawsuit 
by environmental groups in 1998. 
60The George W. Bush Administration, however, has announced that it does not plan to overturn Clinton’s 
monument designations but will seek to adjust the rules governing commercial activities within the 
monuments and also their boundaries.   34
subject to benefit-cost analysis requirements. The economic costs and benefits of many of 
these monument declarations are likely to be quite large and merit further study.
61  
3.4.4  Changes to Federal Wetlands Policy and the Endangered Species Act 
  Wetlands policy and the Endangered Species Act were major targets of property-
rights activists and others in the regulatory reform movement during the 1990s.  Congress 
did not succeed in passing any major changes to Federal wetlands regulation, although 
the executive branch did attempt some important administrative changes.  
  The Clinton Administration expanded wetlands permitting requirements to 
include excavation in 1993, a move that was overturned by the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia in 1997.  A U.S. Supreme Court decision in 2001 overturned the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ 1986 “Migratory Bird Rule,” which had allowed 
regulation of intrastate waters that provide habitat for migratory birds.  These court 
decisions halted Administration attempts to augment the scope of Federal wetlands 
regulation.  In 1998, the Army Corps greatly reduced the scope of nationwide permit 26, 
which authorizes discharges into non-tidal headwaters and isolated waters, a change that 
resulted in lawsuits by the development and commercial communities.
62 In addition, the 
Clinton Administration endorsed the concept of wetlands mitigation banking in 1993, a 
market-based policy instrument, resulting in EPA framework guidance issued in 1995. 
  Attempts to reauthorize the Endangered Species Act in the 1990s failed, but the 
Clinton Administration made some important administrative changes.  It implemented 
three provisions that had been included within many of the unsuccessful Congressional 
reauthorization attempts and had broad bipartisan support.  All of these sought to reverse 
one of the major economic criticisms of the ESA:  that it discourages landowner efforts to 
improve species populations, since larger populations require expanded protections.  
First, voluntary “safe harbor” agreements guarantee that increases in species populations 
                                                 
61For example, the 1.7 million acre Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, declared in 1996, may 
hold low-sulfur coal reserves worth more than $200 billion (Vincent 1998).  The Giant Sequoia National 
Monument, declared in 2000, receives more than 10 million recreational visits per year  (White House 
2000). 
62The so-called “nationwide permits” which authorize landowners to proceed with specified categories of 
activities without obtaining individual permits, reducing regulatory burdens.  The waters governed by 
permit 26 are often difficult to identify as wetlands because they may appear dry for much of the year and 
do not exhibit the vegetation characteristic of wetlands, but scientific evidence is mounting for their 
important function within aquatic ecosystems (Copeland 1999).   35
on private lands will not restrict future land use decisions.  Second, the controversial “no 
surprises” rule guarantees that a landowner properly carrying out a habitat conservation 
plan will not experience further restrictions or costs without mutual consent.  Third, 
“candidate conservation agreements” allow landowners to protect declining species that 
are not yet listed, in exchange for assurance that no additional measures will be required 
if the species is listed. The Administration also emphasized habitat conservation plans 
(HCPs) as a tool to manage endangered and threatened species on non-Federal lands.
63  
HCPs are considerably more flexible than direct enforcement of the Act. 
  As with wetlands issues, timber subsidies, and other natural resource policy 
issues, the distributional implications of the ESA were the focus of much debate during 
the 1990s.  Private landowners objected to use restrictions they believed amounted to de 
facto seizure of private property under the “takings clause” of the Fifth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution.  From an economic perspective, the fact that private property 
owners may be expected to bear the costs of public goods provision is a significant 
distributional concern.  
3.4.5  Green Accounting 
  Critics of the conventional National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) have 
long recognized that the omission of a variety of non-market activities, such as household 
production, unpaid work, and the depletion of natural resource and environmental capital, 
distorts gross domestic product (GDP) as a measure of economic activity (Darmstadter 
2000).  The rationale for including natural resource depletion and environmental quality 
changes within the national accounts, “green accounting”, is grounded in economic 
theory (Weitzman 1976, Solow 1992, Nordhaus and Kokkelenberg 1999), and the idea 
has received additional impetus in the United States from environmentalists. 
  Interest in green accounting in the United States was academic in nature until 
1992, when the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) began 
work on the issue.  Following hearings by the Joint Economic Committee, the 103
rd 
Congress appropriated funds to BEA specifically for this purpose.  The Bureau produced 
                                                 
63Under Section 10 of the ESA, private landowners applying for an “incidental take” permit must submit a 
HCP, in which they agree to restrict some uses in the interest of species and habitat protection in exchange   36
the first official U.S. environmental accounts, the Integrated Environmental and 
Economic Satellite Accounts (IEESA), in 1994.  BEA’s initial effort accounted only for 
selected mineral commodities, including oil, gas, and coal (U.S. Department of 
Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis 1994).  Shortly after the BEA released the 
IEESA, however, Congress suspended BEA’s work on environmental accounting, 
pending external review by a blue-ribbon panel convened by the National Research 
Council’s (NRC) Committee on National Statistics. 
  The NRC panel’s review, released in 1999, strongly supported BEA’s efforts and 
endorsed further efforts to extend the NIPA system to include assets and production 
activities related to natural resources and the environment (Nordhaus and Kokkelenberg 
1999).
64  It encouraged the BEA to include natural resource and environmental flows in 
satellite or supplemental accounts, rather than redefining the core NIPA.  The panel also 
expressed concern that the United States may have fallen behind the ongoing efforts of 
other countries, due to the Congressional stop-work order in 1994, and recommended that 
Congress authorize and fund recommencement o f work on natural resource and 
environmental accounts by the BEA.  Through March 2001, Congress had not funded 
further work on the IEESA.
65 
3.5  Global Climate Change 
  No environmental issue gained in national visibility and political attention more 
during the Clinton years than the threat of global climate change.  We explore the 
implications of this political attention by reviewing the history of executive and 
legislative activities during the 1990s, highlighting the Clinton Administration’s 
emphasis on cost-effectiveness considerations, in particular, the use of market-based 
instruments, both domestically and internationally. 
  In June, 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(FCCC) was negotiated at the Conference on Environment and Development, the so-
                                                                                                                                                 
for the permit.  More than 250 habitat conservation plans were completed between 1992 and 2000, 
compared to 14 between 1982 and 1992. 
64The panel also supported incorporating other non-market activities that are not related to the environment.  
See Nordhaus and Kokkelenberg (1999). 
65There is no sign in the  Congressional Record or in the text of bills proposed during the 105
th or 106
th 
Congresses that additional funding for BEA’s work on the IEESA has been considered.  The issue may be 
tied up in “environmental politics” (Nordhaus 2001).   37
called “Earth Summit,” held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.  The Convention required 
signatories to “achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere 
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system” (United Nations 1992).  Further, it established that because of the global-
commons character of the problem, all nations must be engaged in the pursuit of a 
solution, although different countries could participate in different ways.  This was the 
notion of “common but differentiated responsibilities.”  For industrialized countries, the 
specific challenge was to return greenhouse gas emissions “individually or jointly to their 
1990 levels by the year 2000.” 
  President George Bush signed the FCCC, and the U.S. Senate ratified the 
Convention in October 1992,
66 but the Bush Administration did not commit the United 
States to specific reductions.  This changed with the new Administration.  On Earth Day, 
April 21, 1993, President Bill Clinton committed the United States to reducing its 
emissions of greenhouse gases to 1990 levels by the year 2000, and ordered Federal 
agencies to establish a plan to achieve this goal. 
  In October, the Administration released its Climate Change Action Plan, which 
recommended 52 voluntary measures to meet the emissions goal.  The nature of the 
initiatives in the plan are not unlike those that might have been expected from a second-
term Bush Administration, with their emphasis on voluntary programs, government-
industry cooperation, cost-effectiveness, use of market incentives, and minimal 
mandatory government intervention.
67  But, even if not different in substance, the Clinton 
Administration's Climate Action Plan differed greatly in tone from what had been Bush 
Administration policy.  Not surprisingly, this complex set of voluntary initiatives had 
relatively little effect.  By 1995, the U.S. acknowledged that it would fall short of its 
goals by at least 50 percent. 
                                                 
66By March 2001, 84 nations had signed and 33 countries had ratified or acceded to this agreement.  See 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2001), “Status of Signatories and Ratification 
of the Convention”, Available at http://www.unfccc.int/resource/convkp.html. 
67In 1993, the Administration established the U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation under the Climate 
Change Action Plan.  Joint implementation arrangements allow firms or other entities in one country to 
meet part of their greenhouse gas reduction commitm ents by financing mitigation in another country.  The 
U.S. Initiative through 2000 had approved 26 arrangements whereby U.S. firms agreed to finance projects 
in 11 other countries.   38
  In an important departure from previous policy, in July 1996, at the second 
Conference of the Parties (COP-2) to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, meeting in Berlin, the chief of the U.S. delegation, Undersecretary of State for 
Global Affairs Timothy Wirth, issued a  statement supporting legally binding targets and 
timetables for greenhouse gas emissions reductions for 34 industrialized countries (and 
no targets for the 154 other nations).
68 
  This new approach of binding commitments for industrialized countries only, 
which came to be known as the “Berlin Mandate,” caused substantial concern in the 
business community and in the U.S. Senate, leading to passage in July 1997, by a vote of 
95 to 0, of Senate Resolution 98, subsequently known as the Byrd-Hagel Resolution.  The 
resolution stated that the United States should not approve any agreement at the 
upcoming third Conference of the Parties (COP-3), to be held in Kyoto, Japan, that did 
not impose binding emission reduction targets on all nations. 
  Just five months after passage of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, the nations of the 
world met at COP-3 in Kyoto, and what came to be known as the Kyoto Protocol on 
Climate Change was negotiated, following in the approach laid out by the Berlin Mandate 
and inconsistent with the (non-binding) Byrd-Hagel Resolution.  The industrialized 
nations agreed to legally binding emission reductions, with the United States directed to 
reduce its emissions 7 percent below 1990 levels by  the compliance period, 2008-2012.
69  
The Clinton Administration, in particular Vice President Gore, enthusiastically supported 
the Kyoto Protocol, and the United States became the 60th signatory of the Protocol in 
November 1998.  At the same time, however, because the Protocol clearly did not meet 
the Senate’s stipulations as outlined in the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, the Administration 
made clear that it did not intend to submit the Protocol to the Senate for ratification. 
  In 1998, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) released its analysis 
of the potential costs of U.S. compliance with the Kyoto Protocol emissions targets, at the 
request of the House of Representatives Committee on Science.  The report estimated a 4 
                                                 
68The position statement released at COP-2 also noted U.S. acceptance of the scientific findings on climate 
change summarized by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its Second Assessment 
Report, released in 1995, and rejected uniform harmonized policies in favor of flexible policy instruments, 
including market-based instruments.  See Morrissey (2000).   39
percent reduction in annual GDP through 2010, compared to business-as-usual, a 53 
percent increase in gasoline prices,  and an 87 percent increase in average electricity 
prices.  Note that these cost estimates assumed that the U.S. target would be met entirely 
by reducing U.S. carbon dioxide emissions, that is, with no offsets  from carbon 
sequestration (“sinks”) due to land-use changes, no reductions in other greenhouse gases, 
and no international emissions trading. 
  At about the same time, the U.S. government released another analysis, and one 
which yielded considerably lower cost estimates, mainly because of more generous 
assumptions on some of the factors mentioned above.  In particular, the 1998 analysis by 
the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) estimated costs on the order of 0.5 percent of 
annual GDP if flexible (market-based) policy instruments were employed.  The CEA 
study also predicted no negative effects on the U.S. trade deficit, relatively small 
increases in gasoline prices ($0.05 per gallon), and no significant effects on aggregate 
employment.
70 
  It is important to  note that a key component of the Clinton Administration’s 
climate change policy was its strong and unwavering support for cost-effective 
approaches, including market-based instruments, in particular, tradeable permit 
mechanisms.
71  The Administration’s formal proposal released in preparation for Kyoto 
called for domestic and international emissions trading, and international joint 
implementation.  It was largely because of the efforts of the U.S. negotiating team that 
the Kyoto Protocol included significant provisions for international emissions trading and 
joint implementation projects among the industrialized nations, as well as what came to 
be known as the Clean Development Mechanism for offsets in developing countries. 
                                                                                                                                                 
69Note that because of economic growth, it is anticipated that this 7 percent reduction would translate into 
approximately a 30 percent reduction below baseline emissions, i.e. what they would be in the absence of 
policy action. 
70Note that both analyses were exclusively of the costs of addressing global climate change.  Because of the 
considerable uncertainty regarding the nature and degree of damages due to anticipated climate change, 
there have been fewer analyses of the benefits of policy action.  Nevertheless, there is now a growing 
literature of what have come to be known as integrated assessment models, which examine both sides of 
the ledger.  The range of results from some of the best analyses indicate that relatively small taxes on the 
carbon content of fossil fuels would be warranted in the short run, to keep from rendering large parts of the 
capital stock prematurely obsolete while providing an “insurance policy,” with gradually increasing carbon 
taxes over time.  The earliest work was by Nordhaus (1977, 1982), and the literature is summarized by 
Kolstad and Toman (2000).   40
  Subsequently the United States proposed rules for international emissions trading 
in 1998, at preparatory talks for the Fourth Conference of the Parties.  The U.S. proposal 
faced substantial opposition, most significantly from the European Union.  No agreement 
was reached on emissions trading at the Fourth (1998), Fifth (1999), or Sixth (2000) 
Conference of the Parties.  Indeed, at the Sixth Conference of the Parties, which met in 
The Hague in November, 2000, disagreements between the United States and the 
European Union on the role of carbon sequestration and emissions trading led to the 
breakdown of the talks.  Thus, at the end of the Clinton Administration in January, 2001, 
there was less than full agreement among the countries of the world on the ultimate shape 
of the international agreement, no action towards ratification in the United States, and no 
significant domestic initiatives, other than the voluntary programs of the Administration’s 
1993 Climate Action Plan.
72 
 
IV. What Do We Know About Efficiency, Cost-Effectiveness, and Environmental 
Quality? 
 
  Having reviewed both cross-cutting and specific environmental initiatives of the 
Clinton years, we summarize in this part of the paper what is known about the 
performance of environmental regulation, employing three metrics:  environmental 
quality, cost-effectiveness, and efficiency.   
4.1  Environmental Quality 
  The improvements in aggregate U.S. air quality since the 1970s have been 
summarized often in the literature.  Most notably, between 1979 and 1998, concentrations 
of carbon monoxide fell by 58 percent, nitrogen dioxide by 25 percent, ambient ground-
level ozone by 17 percent and sulfur dioxide by 53 percent (Portney 2000).  Changes in 
                                                                                                                                                 
71The prior Bush Administration had taken a similar position.  See, for example, Stewart and Wiener 
(1992). 
72During the Presidential campaign, candidate George W. Bush stated that he recognized global climate 
change to be a serious problem but believed the Kyoto Protocol to be an inappropriate approach, largely 
because key developing countries are exempt from targets.  In March, 2001, President Bush indicated 
unequivocally that the Administration did not intend to submit the Protocol to the Senate for ratification 
and believed that another approach to the problem was needed.  See Pianin, Eric (2001), “U.S. Aims to Pull 
Out of Warming Treaty; ‘No Interest’ in Implementing Kyoto Pact, Whitman Says”, Washington Post (28   41
aggregate emissions of the criteria air pollutants over the period 1970-1998 are listed in 
Table 5. 
  Improvements in ambient water quality have been less visible, but substantial 
nonetheless.  Between 1974 and 1981, industrial and municipal biological oxygen 
demand loads in the U.S. decreased by 71 percent and 46 percent, respectively (Smith et 
al. 1987).
73  From 1975 to 1994, the share of measured water quality readings in violation 
of Federal standards for fecal coliform bacteria declined by 19 percent, for dissolved 
oxygen by more than 80 percent, and for total phosphorous by 20 percent (Freeman 
2000). 
  But downward trends in emissions and upward trends in environmental quality or 
compliance are not sufficient evidence of the impact of environmental regulations.  In 
order to assess individual regulations or aggregate statutes, we must compare actual 
emissions to what they would have been in the absence of the regulation.  Although it is 
difficult to attribute marginal environmental quality improvements to Federal 
environmental regulations, it has been easier for some media than for others.  Trends in 
air quality have been attributed to Federal regulations both by EPA itself (U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency 1997, 1999), and by independent analyses (Freeman 
1982, Portney 2000).  The impacts of  Federal legislation on water quality are much less 
clear.  One study of the period 1972 to the mid-1990s estimates that increases in the 
number of U.S. river miles meeting water quality standards for swimming, fishing, and 
boating attributable to Federal water quality legislation were only 6.3 percent, 4.2 
percent, and 2.8 percent, respectively, over the 18-year period (Bingham  et al. 1998, 
Freeman 2001).
74  
  These small changes in national compliance with standards are indicators of a 
substantial difference between air and w ater quality in the U.S.  On average, water 
                                                                                                                                                 
March): A01; and Pianin, Eric and William Drozdiak (2000), “U.S. Angers Allies Over Climate Pact; 
Europeans Will Ask Bush to Reconsider”, Washington Post (29 March): A01. 
73These improvements, as well as many local improvements in dissolved oxygen might be attributed, in 
part, to increased wastewater treatment.  Between 1970 and 1985, the fraction of U.S. residents served by 
wastewater treatment facilities increased from 42 to 74 percent (Boyd 2000). 
74Improvements were assessed only for conventional water pollutants; almost no data are available with 
which to assess trends in toxic water pollutants over the past three decades (Freeman 2000).  Boyd (2000) 
notes that Toxics Release Inventory data, available only since the late 1980s, show a decrease in toxic 
discharges to surface water of more than 50 percent between 1987 and 1990.   42
quality in the pre-regulation period (in this case, before the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act of 1972) was fairly good.  Improvements, then, would be more appropriately 
analyzed regionally or locally, since the small national changes mask the fact that some 
local pollution problems have improved dramatically, while other areas already supported 
their designated water uses (Freeman 2001).  In addition, improvements in water quality 
have been achieved largely through point source regulation.  The non-point sources that 
are of principal concern have not been part of the regulatory strategy (see Table  3). 
  What about trends in air and water quality in the 1990s?  Changes in average 
ambient concentrations of five major air pollutants between 1989 and 1998, the last year 
for which such aggregate data are currently available, are described in Table 6.  
Concentrations appear to have decreased significantly over the decade, although we 
should keep in mind the fact that emissions of most of the criteria pollutants declined 
much more dramatically over the twenty years prior to 1990, when the “low-hanging 
fruit” of air quality regulation was being harvested.  Based on EPA modeling of trends in 
emissions with and without the Clean Air Act, the observed decreases in concentrations 
of  these major air pollutants between 1990 and 2000 can “reasonably be attributed to” 
the Clean Air Act and its amendments (Freeman 2001).  During the 1990s, emissions of 
VOC, NOx and SO2 are estimated to have fallen by about one-quarter, CO emissions by 
15 percent, and particulate matter by about two percent (Table 7).  Following the pattern 
of 30-year trends, trends in water quality over the past decade have been much more 
modest than trends in a ir quality, and in some cases (particularly nonpoint source 
pollution in the form of runoff from cities and agricultural areas) may have been negative 
(Freeman 2001).  
4.2  The Cost of a Clean Environment 
  At the beginning of the decade of the 1990s, two g eneral equilibrium analyses 
were carried out of the effects of environmental regulations on the U.S. economy (Hazilla 
and Kopp 1990, Jorgenson and Wilcoxen 1990), and an EPA assessment was developed 
on the costs of the major environmental regulations (U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency 1991).  Neither of the general equilibrium analyses attempted to quantify the 
benefits of environmental regulation, but both illustrated the fact that costs, correctly 
calculated, include more than the capital and operating costs of compliance (Table 8).    43
The magnitude of the cost estimates ($977 billion from 1981 to 1990, according to 
Hazilla and Kopp) indicated that the long-run aggregate social costs of regulation are 
considerable.
75 
  The 1991 EPA report,  Environmental Investments: The Cost of a Clean 
Environment, was drafted in response to Section 312(a) of the Clean Air Act and Section 
516(b) of the Clean Water Act.  The report provided estimates of the direct costs of 
pollution control regulations in the United States from 1972 to 2000, including public-
sector implementation and private-sector compliance.
76  No attempt was made to 
monetize the benefits of regulation, or even to establish a link between the environmental 
quality statistics generated and the regulations for which costs were calculated.
77  The 
report estimated annualized regulatory implementation and compliance costs of more 
than two percent of U.S. Gross National Product (GNP) in 1990. 
  No conclusions about economic efficiency can be drawn from these analyses 
because benefits were not monetized, but these studies focused attention on the rising 
costs of environmental regulation in absolute terms and as a fraction of GNP.  In 
addition, a relatively recent literature in environmental economics has noted that the 
ultimate costs of any given environmental policy initiative depend on interactions 
between the new policy and existing regulations or tax policies.  In particular, additional 
costs can arise from interactions between climate policies and pre-existing distortions in 
the economy, such as those due to taxes on labor (Goulder 1995).  Some policy 
instruments, such as taxes and auctioned permits, generate revenues, which can be used 
by governments to reduce pre-existing taxes, thereby reducing what the overall costs of 
the policy would otherwise be.   
 
                                                 
75While only 13 business sectors in the United States made direct pollution control investments, all 36 
sectors experienced increased costs and decreased output and labor productivity due to environmental 
regulation (Hazilla and Kopp 1990).  Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990) estimate that environmental 
regulation reduces U.S. Gross National Product by about 2.6 percent per year.  For additional analysis of 
the aggregate costs of regulation, see Hahn and Hird (1991). 
76The cost estimates included expenditures related to:  CAA; the Radon Gas and Indoor Air Quality 
Research Act of 1986; Radon Pollution Control Act of 1988; CWA; Marine Protection, Sanctuaries and 
Research Act; SDWA; RCRA; CERCLA; TSCA; FIFRA; Energy Security Act; and Title III of the 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act. 
77It did attempt to estimate counterfactual (without regulation) emissions of air pollutants and precursors 
from 1970 to 1988, and provided comparisons of these counterfactual statistics with actual emissions.   44
4.3  What Do We Know About the Efficiency of Environmental Policies? 
  In writing environmental statutes, the Congress has sent decidedly mixed 
messages regarding the use of benefit-cost analysis to decide when and what to regulate 
and to choose among regulatory alternatives.
78  We would therefore expect the relative 
efficiency of the major environmental statutes to vary widely.  Available analyses range 
from aggregate assessments of the costs and benefits of environmental regulation as a 
whole to assessments of individual rules.   
4.3.1  Efficiency of the Major Environmental Statutes 
  Aggregate benefit-cost analysis of statutes is problematic for both technical and 
practical reasons.  The establishment of an appropriate counterfactual is technically 
difficult––we need to establish what emissions would have been in the absence of the 
Clean Air Act, for example, to attribute emissions reductions over time to the Act.  
Practically, typical policy dilemmas do not involve creation and elimination of entire 
statutes, but rather marginal changes to individual regulations (which will be discussed 
later).  Nonetheless, the few existing efficiency analyses of the major statutes are 
illuminating. 
  Two of the most important Federal environmental statutes, the Clean Air Act and 
the Clean Water Act, have been the subjects of benefit-cost analysis.  Under Section 812 
of the 1990 CAA Amendments, Congress required EPA to undertake:  (1) a retrospective 
benefit-cost analysis of the 1970 CAA and its 1977 amendments; and (2) biennial 
prospective analyses of the 1990 Amendments.  By EPA’s calculations, the 1970 CAA 
and 1977 and 1990 amendments pass benefit-cost tests by very wide margins.   The 
retrospective study, presented to Congress in 1997, estimated direct costs of CAA 
regulatory implementation and compliance from 1970 to 1990 to be $689 billion and 
                                                 
78The Flood Control Act of 1936 may include the first U.S. legislative mandate to use benefit-cost analysis: 
“The Federal government should improve or participate in the improvement of navigable waters or their 
tributaries, including watersheds thereof, if the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are in excess of 
estimated costs.”  See National Center for Environmental Decision-Making Research (2000), “Cost-Benefit 
Analysis,” available at http://www.ncedr.org/tools/othertools/costbenefit/module1.htm.. Several statutes 
have been interpreted to restrict the ability of regulators to consider benefits and costs, such as the RCRA 
and the Delaney Clause of the FFDCA.  Others, including TSCA and FIFRA, explicitly order regulators to 
consider benefits and costs (Arrow et al. 1996).  For a comprehensive review of the inclusion or exclusion 
of benefit-cost criteria from regulatory action under most major Federal environmental legislation, see 
Schierow (1994).   45
direct benefits to be $29.3 trillion.  In 1999, EPA presented its first prospective study 
(1990-2010) to Congress, with net benefits estimated for the period to be $672 billion
79 
  These estimates are highly controversial.  According to the retrospective analysis, 
benefits of the CAA from 1970 to 1990 exceeded costs by a factor of 42, a difference 
much greater than estimated by other studies (Freeman 1982, 2000).  The estimates 
appear improbable.  EPA’s “best estimates” of net benefits of the CAA through 1990, 
$22 trillion, were estimated to be approximately equal to aggregate U.S. household net 
worth in that year (Lutter and Belzer 2000).  Further, the number of annual avoided 
deaths attributed to the CAA was 10 percent of all annual deaths in the United States 
(Portney 2000).  Others have criticized the retrospective and prospective studies on the 
grounds that they exclude the indirect costs of increased prices for goods and services due 
to the Act, exclude the costs of meeting some of the Act’s costly  provisions, and 
potentially exaggerate the risk-reduction benefits associated with particulate matter 
reduction, which account for more than 90 percent of the benefits estimated for the 1990 
CAA Amendments (Lutter and Belzer 2000).
80 
  On the other hand, what is perhaps most important is that the general finding that 
the benefits of air pollution regulation have exceeded its costs is well supported by other 
studies (Freeman 1982, Portney 2000).  We understand less about how marginal benefits 
and costs of specific air pollution regulations have varied over time, though it appears 
many such regulations would not pass a benefit-cost test.  In addition, there appears to be 
a downward trend in net benefits of air pollution regulation, indicated by the results of the 
retrospective and prospective studies and the individual efficiency analyses for recent 
rules (Morgenstern 2000, Freeman 2001).
81 
  The Clean Water Act also has been analyzed in a benefit-cost framework, with 
considerably less favorable results.  Estimates of annual benefits of the CWA range from 
                                                 
79The 90 percent confidence interval of net benefits ranged from - $26.4 billion (net cost) to + $1.8 trillion.  
The first prospective study estimated the benefits of selected ecological effects; the retrospective study did 
not. EPA’s figures were calculated in constant 1990 dollars; these have been converted to 2000 dollars. 
80Freeman (2001) emphasizes another aspect of EPA’s analysis; while the stationary source regulations 
under the CAA appear to have benefits greatly exceeding costs, in aggregate, the mobile source regulations 
taken together appear to have substantial net costs. 
81An important caveat is that the cited studies did not review recent regulations on particulate matter nor 
potential regulations affecting CO2 emissions associated with global climate change, which may not 
conform to the observed downward trend in measured net benefits.   46
$24.8 billion in 1985 (Freeman 1982) to $38.4 billion in 1990 (Carson and Mitchell 
1993).
82  Cost estimates range from $46.6 billion in 1985 to $59.7 billion in 1990 (U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency 1991).
83  While subject to much uncertainty, a rough 
comparison of these estimates supports the conjecture that the CWA’s overall costs 
outweigh its benefits (Freeman 2000).  Estimates by others have shown that the 
incremental costs of specific CWA rules also exceed their benefits (Lyon and Farrow 
1995). 
  It should not be surprising, perhaps, that the CWA measures up less favorably 
than the CAA in terms of economic efficiency.  The stated goals of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act of 1972 were: (1) the attainment of fishable and swimmable waters 
by July 1, 1983; and (2) the elimination of all discharges of pollutants into navigable 
waters by 1985.  While those deadlines were postponed, and a distinction made between 
organic pollutants and toxics by the 1977 Amendments, the CWA continues to emphasize 
a target of zero emissions and fails to distinguish among bodies of water with different 
uses.  In addition, applications of market-based instruments have come more slowly to 
water pollution than to air pollution policy.  
  The other major Federal environmental statutes are more difficult to assess, 
because few, and in some cases, no aggregate benefit-cost studies have been carried out.  
FIFRA and TSCA are the two major statutes that explicitly allow benefit-cost 
considerations in rule making.
84  One of EPA’s responsibilities under FIFRA is pesticide 
registration, which triggers a benefit-cost test that results in either cancellation, 
suspension, continuation of registration with restrictions, or unrestricted continuation.  
EPA  does appear to take benefits and costs into account in these decisions, but its 
decisions from 1975 to 1989 imply a value per statistical cancer case among pesticide 
                                                 
82The 90 percent confidence interval for the Carson and Mitchell (1993) estimate is $29 billion to $54 
billion, and for the Freeman (1982) estimate is $9.1 billion to $44.3 billion. No CWA benefit estimates 
have included potential benefits to commercial fisheries and diversionary uses, indicating that true benefits 
may be somewhat higher than those c ited above.  Freeman (1982) does not include the benefits from 
control of toxic pollutants and heavy metals, which are both included in EPA’s cost calculations.  On the 
other hand, the counterfactual for many benefit calculations, including Carson and Mitchell (1993), is taken 
to be “no control”, which may substantially overstate CWA benefits. 
83All CWA cost and benefit figures are expressed in constant 2000 dollars. 
84One reason that benefit-cost procedures were written into FIFRA and TSCA, while explicitly written out 
of other regulatory statutes, may be that these two statutes regulate commodities, rather than wastes 
(Morgenstern 1997c).   47
applicators of more than 580 times the implied value for consumers of pesticide residues 
on food (Cropper et al. 1992).  While benefit-cost tests are applied under FIFRA, they do 
not appear to be applied consistently. 
  CERCLA, or Superfund, is a frequent target of critics on efficiency grounds.  One 
particularly comprehensive assessment of the efficiency of Superfund considered a 
representative sample of 150 clean-up sites, and found mean remediation cost per cancer 
case avoided to be $3.6 million (Hamilton and Viscusi 1999).  This mean cost estimate 
masks considerable variance, however, since both risks and costs are highly concentrated 
at a small number of sites.  About 70 percent of sites with nonzero cancer cases averted 
had costs per case averted greater than $100 million.
85 
  The analysis of Superfund is illustrative because it shows how aggregate analyses 
of statutes or programs can obscure great differences in the net benefits of individual 
rules or activities.  Within the CAA, for example, a handful of individual rules, like those 
governing lead in gasoline and reductions in fine particulate matter, are responsible for a 
substantial portion of the health benefits attributed to the statute.  Counterbalancing the 
regulations that confer large net benefits are other regulations, such as the NAAQS 
governing ozone precursors, that do n ot pass a benefit-cost test.  Economists generally 
agree on the need to look at the incremental impacts of such regulations for policy 
making, but only recently have they begun to devote substantial resources to this task. 
4.3.2  Efficiency of Individual Rules 
  Since 1981, Federal agencies have been required to submit Regulatory Impact 
Analyses to OMB for all new rules expected to have aggregate costs of $100 million or 
greater.  The increased visibility of benefits and costs that has resulted from the RIA 
process has led to greater scrutiny of the analyses and the rules that trigger them. 
  There are many examples of environmental rules for which RIAs have estimated 
positive net benefits, including the lead-in-gasoline rule (Nichols 1997) and the NAAQS 
for particulate matter (U.S. Office of Management and Budget 1998).  Likewise, the 
estimated benefits of the SO2 emissions trading program under Title IV of the 1990 CAA 
                                                 
85These figures have been converted from constant 1993 dollars to 2000 dollars.  They are substantially 
greater than reasonable estimates of willingness to pay numbers, which typically range from $4 to $9 
million, in constant 2000 dollars (Viscusi 1992).   48
Amendments are greater than its estimated costs by an order of magnitude (Burtraw et al. 
1998). 
  The requirements for Regulatory Impact Analysis, however, have not necessarily 
improved the efficiency of individual Federal environmental rules.  One study compared 
the cost-per-life-saved of 33 individual risk-reducing rules (a mix of proposed and final 
rules) from Federal regulatory agencies, 15 of them from EPA (Viscusi 1992).
86  Of the 
EPA rules, only one had a cost-per-life-saved of less than $6.7 million.  A more recent 
study that included twelve EPA rules, only two actually reduce risk, while the other ten 
could actually increase risk by reducing private expenditures on risk-reducing 
investments (Hahn  et al. 2000b).  Table 9 summarizes the cost of selected EPA 
regulations per statistical life saved.
87 
  In the first eleven years of the RIA review process, the lowest cost-per-life-saved 
of any rule rejected by OMB was $142 million, indicating that OMB may have succeeded 
in eliminating only some of the most inefficient regulations (Viscusi 1996).  In the first 
fifteen years of the review process, about two-thirds of the Federal government’s 
approved environmental quality regulations failed these statutory benefit-cost tests, using 
the government’s own numbers (Hahn 2000). One example is the NAAQS for ozone, for 
which EPA submitted an RIA that listed $2.0 to $11.2 billion in monetized benefits and 
$12.7 billion in costs through 2010, assuming full attainment (U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget 1998). 
   In another study of a dozen proposed rules at EPA that required economic 
analysis, only four clearly passed a benefit-cost test performed by the agency itself 
(Morgenstern 1997a).   On the other hand, the estimated benefits of just three of the rules 
studied exceeded the estimated cost of all twelve rules combined, reinforcing the fact that 
aggregate analysis of a group of rules can be misleading (Morgenstern 1997b).   In all 
cases, economic analysis contributed to changes in rules that decreased costs, and in five 
                                                 
86Viscusi’s statistics were drawn, in large part, from Morrall (1986) and updates to Morrall (1986) through 
unpublished communication. 
87To the extent that there are important non-mortality benefits, these studies may be misleading, although 
Hahn et al. (2000a) tried to control for this by examining rules that focus on mortality benefits.   49
cases to changes that increased benefits, demonstrating that RIAs can be used to improve 
cost-effectiveness, even if the standard to be set is not economically efficient.
88 
  After agencies submit RIAs to OMB for review, interest groups can submit 
comments for the public record.  In addition, in the last few years, independent groups 
have begun to submit formal comments that enter into the public dialogue as working 
papers and published articles.  These efforts often target rules that appear to be inefficient 
or ineffective, particularly in cases where interest groups wish to the reduce the cost of 
the rule imposed on them.  These analyses have helped identify important patterns in the 
economics of regulatory decision making. 
  First, economic analyses prepared by regulatory agencies frequently fail to 
provide sufficient information to make valid benefit-cost comparisons.  Less than 30 
percent of new environmental, health, and safety regulations from mid-1996 to mid-1999 
quantified net benefits, and very few compared multiple regulatory alternatives (Hahn et 
al. 2000a).  Second, in many cases, the environmental statutes,  themselves, limit the 
extent to which RIAs could affect policy outcomes, by for example, forbidding the 
consideration of costs in decision making. 
  Third, the existence of a large public database of ex-ante estimates of the costs 
and benefits of environmental regulations has made it possible to begin comparing ex-
ante and ex-post estimates, which may be the best way to gauge the quality of agencies’ 
efficiency calculations.  The first major study to attempt this reviewed more than two 
dozen major environmental and occupational safety regulations, and found that ex ante 
estimates of costs systematically exceeded actual costs, although when EPA regulations 
were considered in isolation, no evidence of systematic bias in either direction was found 
(Harrington et al. 2000).
89 
     
                                                 
88In some cases, environmental statutes n ecessitate that RIAs not be the primary decision factor in 
rulemaking (Caulkins and Sessions 1997, Rasmussen 1997, Anderson and Rykowski 1997).  Barring 
legislative changes in these cases, use of RIAs to improve the cost-effectiveness of regulations may be the 
most that can be expected.   In addition, many RIAs do not contain enough information to compare the 
cost-effectiveness of multiple regulatory alternatives, which, in general, prevents them from being useful 
cost-effectiveness tools. See Hahn et al. (2000a). 
89Another analysis of the chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) phaseout in the U.S. also indicates that EPA may 
underestimate costs ex ante (Hammitt 2000).   50
4.4  What Do We Know About the Cost Effectiveness of Environmental Policies? 
  It has frequently been pointed out that environmental laws are not cost-effective, 
often specifying specific technologies or uniform emissions limits, despite tremendous 
variation in firm abatement costs (Newell and Stavins 2001, Tietenberg 1990).  While 
uniform standards may effectively limit emissions of pollutants, they typically exact 
relatively high costs in the process, by forcing some firms to resort to unduly expensive 
means of controlling pollution.  For example, under current regulations the marginal cost 
of abating lead emissions ranges from $13 per ton in the non-metal products sector to 
$56,000 per ton in the food sector (Hartman et al. 1994, Morgenstern 2000). 
  Market-based approaches to environmental protection can be used to achieve the 
least-cost allocation of pollution reduction, even when the aggregate target is not 
efficient; thus, cost-effectiveness can be seen as a criterion quite separate from efficiency 
(Baumol and Oates 1971).  Since the 1970s, the advantages of economic-incentive 
approaches to environmental regulation have received serious political attention, and 
there have been increasing numbers of applications in the United States and other 
countries (Stavins 2001). 
  Analysts have compared the costs of some of the larger U.S. market-based 
environmental policies with those of alternative (hypothetical) command-and-control 
policies.
90 One survey of eight empirical studies of U.S. air pollution control found that 
the ratio of actual, aggregate costs of the conventional, command-and-control approach to 
the aggregate costs of least-cost benchmarks ranged from 1.07 for sulfate emissions in the 
Los Angeles area to 22.0 for hydrocarbon emissions at all domestic DuPont plants 
(Tietenberg 1985).  One should not make too much of these numbers, however, since 
actual, command-and-control instruments are being compared with theoretical 
benchmarks of cost-effectiveness, i.e. what a perfectly functioning market-based 
instrument would achieve in theory.  A fair comparison among policy instruments would 
involve either idealized versions of both market-based systems and likely alternatives; or 
realistic versions of both. 
                                                 
90Like benefit-cost analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis is required by the 1993 Clinton EO 12866, which 
directs agencies to identify and assess alternative policies (with an emphasis on incentive-based 
mechanisms).   51
  EPA’s Emissions Trading Program, which started in 1974 as the “offset” policy 
and was codified in 1986, is one individual program for which cost savings have been 
estimated.  The only comprehensive study of cost savings based on actual trades 
estimates that the program achieved savings of $1.6 to $21.5 billion over its first 14 years 
(Hahn and Hester 1989).  
  Another program that has been analyzed for cost-effectiveness is EPA’s lead-in-
gasoline rule, which allowed inter-refinery trading of lead credits beginning in 1982, and 
banking of credits in 1985.  EPA estimates that trading and banking generated cost 
savings of 20 percent per year over alternative regulation through 1987, when the 
phasedown was complete (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1985).  Although no 
other actual cost savings estimate exists, an independent analysis of the level of trading 
activity and the rate of the lead phasedown suggests that the program was indeed cost-
effective (Kerr and Maré 1997). 
  The market-based policy instruments resulting from the 1990 CAA Amendments 
were discussed earlier.  The market for tradeable SO2 emission permits among U.S. 
electric utilities established under Title IV has the potential to save more than $280 
million annually through Phase I (1995-2000), and more than $880 million annually 
during Phase II (after 2000), compared with a uniform emissions rate standard (Carlson et 
al. 2000).
91  The regional NOx cap-and-trade system in the Northeast may generate 
compliance cost savings of 40 to 47 percent compared with continued command-and-
control regulation of ozone precursors (Farrell et al. 1999). 
  One state-level market-based environmental program has also been analyzed in a 
cost-effectiveness framework.  The South Coast Air Quality Management District, which 
is responsible for controlling emissions in a four-county area of southern California, 
launched a tradeable permit program in January 1994 to reduce NOx and SO2 emissions 
in the Los Angeles area.  While no analysis of actual cost savings has been performed, 
one prospective analysis predicted 42 percent cost savings annually over traditional 
regulation (Anderson 1997). 
                                                 
91These figures have been converted to constant 2000 dollars. Highlighting the difficulty of estimating cost 
savings compared with a hypothetical policy alternative, Carlson et al. (2000) also estimate actual cost 
savings during two program years, 1995 and 1996, and suggest that the allowance market has not realizes   52
  While these results are heartening for economists who advocate applying market-
based instruments to environmental policy, they barely scratch the surface of 
environmental regulation as a whole.  While agencies are required to perform cost-
effectiveness analysis w ithin RIAs, more than one-quarter of RIAs discuss no policy 
alternatives, and barely one-third of RIAs quantify the costs and benefits of alternative 




  Looking back over the past decade of environmental policy, it is striking how 
much of it is independent of the identity of the particular administration.  Much of this 
policy is determined by existing laws and regulations and by the political equilibrium 
among the courts, the Congress, the President, and the key departments and agencies in 
the Administration.  Nevertheless, Congress and the Administration can and do make a 
significant difference.  Here we identify five themes that emerge from our review of 
national environmental policy during the years of the Clinton Administration, and we 
comment briefly on the political context that may suggest how economics will evolve in 
environmental and resource policy in the years to come. 
  First, environmental targets were made more stringent, and environmental quality 
improved significantly during the decade.  Most important among the new targets were 
the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for ambient ozone and particulate matter, 
issued by EPA in July, 1997.  These could turn out to be one of the Clinton 
Administration’s most enduring environmental legacies, both in terms of potential 
benefits and potential costs. 
  Natural resource policy during the Clinton years was heavily weighted toward 
environmental protection.  A number of initiatives were proposed to reduce subsidies for 
private resource extraction on public lands, targeting below-market timber sales, grazing 
fees, and subsidized mining of non-renewable resources.  More importantly, there was a 
significant shift in priorities at the U.S. Forest Service away from a focus on timber 
production to resource protection.  One aspect of this was the Administration’s proposal, 
                                                                                                                                                 
these potential “gains from trade” to date.  The 1995 compliance costs measured by Carlson et al. (2000) 
actually exceeded their estimate for the command-and-control alternative.    53
in its last month, to place some 60 million acres of Federal forest land off limits to new 
road building.  In addition, the Administration designated more than 20 new national 
monuments and expanded three others, thus restricting use of about 6 million acres of 
Federal lands. 
  Environmental quality improved overall during the decade, continuing a trend that 
started in the 1970s.  Emissions of major  air pollutants fell significantly, and these 
changes can be attributed, in part, to the Clean Air Act and its amendments.  The 
decreases were much less than during the previous two decades, however, which is not 
surprising given that the low-hanging fruit  had already been picked.  Trends in water 
quality over the decade of the 1990s were less clear, and in some cases reflected 
increased pollution levels. 
  Second, the use of benefit-cost analysis for assessing environmental regulation 
was controversial in the Clinton Administration, while economic efficiency emerged as a 
central goal of the regulatory reform movement in the Congress during the 1990s.  
Despite a series of supportive executive orders, there is little evidence that economic 
efficiency was accepted as a legitimate criterion for environmental policy during the 
Clinton years.  The Administration's support for benefit-cost analysis in environmental, 
health, and safety decision-making was  — with some exceptions — no more than 
modest.  At the Environmental Protection Agency, there was significantly more 
opposition to the use of this analytical tool for decision-making. 
  In contrast, economic efficiency was a central goal of regulatory reform efforts in 
the Congress, especially after the Republican takeover in the 1994 midterm elections.  
Major amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act were passed, containing the most 
stringent requirement for benefit-cost analysis of any environmental statute.  Legislators 
were less successful at reforming other environmental statutes that had been criticized on 
efficiency grounds, but the Congress did pass a variety of cross-cutting regulatory reform 
initiatives, aimed at increasing the efficiency of environmental, health, and safety 
regulations. 
  When attention was given during the 1990s to increased efficiency, the locus of 
that attention during the Clinton years was the Congress in the case of environmental 
policies and the Administration in the case of natural resource policies.  While Congress   54
was generally supportive of the use of benefit-cost analysis for assessing environmental 
regulations, it did not offer support in the context of natural resource policies.  When 
policy alternatives regarding efficient use of natural resources did emerge during the 
1990s, they were proposed by the Clinton Administration. 
  Ironically, the increased attention given to benefit-cost analysis may not have had 
a marked effect on the economic efficiency of environmental regulations.  The evidence 
indicates that the overall benefits of air pollution regulation have exceeded its costs, but 
the picture is mixed when one examines specific air pollution regulations.  In general, 
there appears to be a downward trend in net benefits of such regulations over time.  
Furthermore, the Clean Water Act measures up much less favorably than the Clean Air 
Act in terms of economic efficiency. 
  Third,  cost-effectiveness achieved a much more prominent position in public 
discourse regarding environmental policy during the 1990s.  From the Bush 
Administration through the Clinton Administration, interest and activity regarding 
market-based instruments for environmental protection—particularly tradeable permit 
systems—continued to increase, while support for taxes was lukewarm.  The 
Administration promoted cost-effectiveness by supporting the implementation of existing 
market-based initiatives, including the sulfur dioxide allowance trading program, and by 
proposing  new initiatives, exemplified by the strong U.S. support for tradeable permit 
programs for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  The performance of market-based 
instruments that were implemented—from the 1980s through the 1990s—was 
encouraging, including the leaded gasoline phasedown in the 1980s and the SO2 
allowance trading program in the 1990s. 
  Fourth,  the Clinton Administration put much greater emphasis than previous 
administrations on expanding the role of environmental information disclosure and 
voluntary programs.  In 1994, EPA expanded the list of chemicals to be reported under 
the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) by 80 percent; it lowered reporting thresholds, and 
later expanded the list again.  In addition, EPA launched a number of other information 
programs, focusing on energy efficiency and contaminants in drinking water.  While such 
programs can provide cost-effective ways of reaching environmental policy goals,  we 
know very little about their costs or their effectiveness.  EPA also initiated dozens of   55
programs designed to encourage sources to reduce emissions on a voluntary basis, many 
under the “Common Sense Initiative.”  These too have the potential to be cost-effective, 
but it is unclear whether the programs were actually successful. 
  Fifth and finally,  the Environmental Protection Agency reduced the role of 
economic analysis in decisionmaking during the 1990s.  During the Clinton years, the 
EPA was more hostile toward economic analysis than it had been during the prior Bush 
Administration, and EPA leadership made organizational changes to reflect this shift.  
When economics did play a role, economic analysis was more likely to be focused on 
increasing the cost-effectiveness of regulations than on weighing benefits against costs. 
  These five themes emerge within the broader political context of environmental 
policy.  In simple terms, Democrats, supported by environmental advocacy groups, 
typically oppose benefit-cost analysis as a criterion for identifying environmental targets, 
because it is seen by many as a mechanism to reduce environmental protection efforts.  
Republicans, supported by business interests, usually support greater use of benefit-cost 
analysis for precisely the same reason.  In the context of public lands and natural resource 
issues, the application of benefit-cost analysis typically implies limited resource use.  
Hence, we observe greater support from the Democrats to implement policies that could 
enhance efficiency in this case. 
  In contrast to efficient policies, cost-effective policies and thus market-based 
instruments are far easier for both Democrats and Republicans to endorse.  If a goal is set, 
why not find the least costly way of achieving it?  There are exceptions, of course, most 
notably when there are identifiable losers from particular policies. 
  Much can be explained by business-as-usual in Washington, but politics is only 
part of the explanation.  Ideas also matter.  The very notions of applying economic 
analysis in environmental and resources policy design and using economic instruments in 
policy implementation are becoming more widely accepted.  We expect  the future to 
bring more benefit-cost analysis, more risk analysis, more cost-effectiveness analysis, 
and more use of market-based policy instruments.  Whether or not this analysis will 
improve policy is less clear, but we believe that environmental policies are likely to 
become more cost-effective over time, if only because policy makers and interest groups 
will have better information at their disposal.  More broadly, the efficiency of   56
environmental and resource policy in the future will depend, to some extent, on the 
ability of economists to convince the broader policy community of the value of this way 
of thinking about the world.  
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TABLE 1:  EVOLUTION OF ORGANIZATION OF  
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AT EPA 
 
 


















Benefits Staff, Office of Policy Evaluation, Office of Policy and Resource Management 
 
Benefits Branch, Office of Policy Analysis, Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation 
 
Economic Analysis Branch, Office of Policy Analysis, Office of Policy, Planning and 
Evaluation 
 
Economic Analysis and Research Branch, Office of Policy Analysis, Office of Policy, 
Planning and Evaluation 
 
Economy and Environment Division, Office of Economy and Environment, Office of 
Policy, Planning and Evaluation 
 
Economic and Policy Analysis Division and Economy and Environment Division, Office of 
Economy and Environment, Office of Policy and Reinvention 
 
National Center for Environmental Economics, Office of Policy, Economics and Innovation 
 
SOURCE:  U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Center for Environmental Economics World 




TABLE 2:  SELECTED LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS 









Title/Definition and Intended Impact on Risk, 


























































Federal Mandate Accountability and Reform Act of 
1994.  Would have required CBO to estimate costs 
of Federal mandates to state, local and tribal 
governments, compelled agencies to analyze 
benefits and costs of new Federal mandates.
b 
 
Water Quality Act of 1994 / Water Pollution 
Prevention and Control Act of 1994.  
Reauthorization legislation for Clean Water Act; 
considered making CWA more flexible, less 
prescriptive regarding non-point source regulation, 
municipal stormwater regulation, wetlands 
designation and permitting. 
 
CERCLA reauthorization legislation. Would have 
required EPA to establish a national protocol for 
risk assessment. 
 
FIFRA Amendments of 1994.  Would have directed 
EPA administrator to develop criteria for 
designation of “reduced risk pesticides”, required 




Amendment to a bill to raise EPA to department 
status. Would have required EPA to analyze risks, 
costs, and benefits for proposed and final 
regulations.   
 
SDWA FY95 Authorization Bill / SDWA 
Amendments of 1994.  S. 2019 would have required 
EPA to rank pollution sources based on risk.
d  H.R. 
3392 would have required EPA to consider risk 
reduction benefits and costs in setting standards.  
Both would have eliminated 1986 requirement that 
EPA regulate 25 more contaminants every 3 years. 
 
National Competitiveness Act of 1993. Would have 
required economic and employment impact 
statements for all rules posted in the Federal 
Register. 
 
Environmental Research, Development, and 
Demonstration Authorization Act of 1993.  Would 
have established core research program on risk 
reduction. 
 
Environmental Technologies Act of 1994. Would 
have required Office of Science and Technology 
Policy to establish protocol for conducting and 
reporting risk assessments. 
Referred to 
committee in House 




Reported in Senate, 
introduced in House, 






Reported in both 
House and Senate, no 
floor action taken. 
 
Referred to 
committee in House 










Passed Senate and  







Passed House and 









Passed House, placed 














Risk Assessment Improvement Act of 1994. Would 
have established EPA program to develop risk 
assessment guidelines, oversee implementation, 
require scientific peer review, etc. 
























































Title III -- Job Creation and Wage Enhancement 
Act, Contract With America Item 8.  Would have 
made Reagan E.O. 12291 statutory, superseding 
Clinton E.O. 12866. Both bills would have imposed 
a strict net-benefits test  before a regulation could go 
forward. 
 
Debt Ceiling Limit Bill.  Attached regulatory reform 
package (Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 
1995) would have broadened definition of “major 
rule” requiring RIA, expanded public review 
requirements, standardized regulatory risk 
assessment.  
 
Rider to FY 1996 VA -HUD Independent Agencies 
appropriations bill.  The House approved 17 major 
riders that would have prohibited EPA from 
spending FY 1996 funds on a number of regulatory 
and enforcement activities. 
 
FY97 Omnibus Appropriations Bill.  Rider directed 
OMB to submit regulatory accounting (benefit-cost) 
report to Congress for FY97.  (This rider was 
attached in future years, as well.) 
 
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness 
Act of 1996.  EPA must prepare regulatory 
flexibility analyses of bills with significant 
economic impact on small businesses and submit 
analyses to Congress. 
 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995.  Requires 
quantitative assessment of benefits and comparison 
of benefits to costs for all major rules; mandates 
choice of least-cost regulatory alternative or 
explanation why least-cost alternative was not 
chosen. 
 
Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996.  
Requires EPA to determine whether the benefits of 
all new drinking water maximum contaminant 
levels (MCLs) justify the costs.  Revokes mandate 
that EPA regulate 25 new contaminants every 3 
years. 
 
Clean Water Act Amendments of 1995.  Would 
have made CWA less prescriptive, amending 
standards, regulatory requirements and wetlands 
dredge and fill permitting. 
 
Food Quality Protection Act of 1996. Amends 
Passed House, 






Passed House and 






Passed House and 






























Passed House, no 




























FIFRA and the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic 
Act.  Removes pesticide residues on processed food 
from the list of Delaney “zero-risk standard” 
substances. 
 
Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of 
1996.  Requires Secretary of Transportation to issue 
pipeline safety regulations only upon justification 
that benefits exceed costs. 
 
Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act Reauthorization.  Authorized collection of fees 
for limited fishery access programs.  Prohibited the 
creation of new individual fishing quota programs 
through October 2000. 
 
Omnibus FY96 Appropriations Bill.  Title III 
established demonstration project allowing 






































S. 8 / H.R. 2727 
 
Regulatory Improvement Act of 1997, 1998, 1999, 
or “Thompson-Levin bill”.  Would have broadened 
benefit-cost analysis requirements. Some versions 
would have allowed courts to remand or invalidate 
rules formulated by an agency that fails to perform 
sufficient benefit-cost analysis. 
 
FY98 Treasury and General Government 
Appropriations Act. Rider directed OMB to submit 
regulatory accounting (benefit-cost) report to 
Congress for FY98.  (This rider was first attached in 
FY97.) 
 
Superfund Cleanup Acceleration Act of 1997, 
1998.
f  Title IV would have revised risk assessment 
requirements, included “reasonableness of cost” 
within list of considerations to be balanced in 
selection of remedial action. 













Reported in Senate, 






S. 1198  Truth in Regulating Act (TIRA).  Establishes a 
three-year pilot program under which individual 
agency RIAs are subject to independent evaluation 
by GAO, upon request by Congress. 
P.L. 106-312. 
 
aThe legislative initiatives described in this table are those that would have had (or did have) an effect on 
environmental regulations’ treatment of efficiency or cost-effectiveness criteria.  For many of these 
initiatives, this aspect was not the main purpose, but only one of many stipulations or amendments. 
 
bMany other measures in the 103
rd Congress also called for CBO cost estimation and/or economic analysis 
of mandates, including S. 563, S. 648, S. 1592, S. 1604, and S. 1606 (Lee 1995).
 
 
cThese two bills attempted to introduce into statute the Clinton Administration’s Comprehensive Pesticide 
Proposal to Congress of April 1994.
 
 
dS. 2019 was a revised version of Senator Moynihan’s S. 110.
 
 
eThe House defeated the EPA department-status bill (H.R. 3425) because it did not allow floor 





fMany CERCLA reauthorization and reform bills were introduced in the 105
th Congress, including S. 8, 
H.R. 2727, H.R. 3000, H.R. 2750, H.R. 3262, H.R. 3595, and S. 2180 (Reisch 1998).  The two discussed 
here were the most seriously considered. 
 
SOURCES:  Blodgett (1998); Hahn (2000), especially Table IV; and Lee  (1995); U.S. Library of 
Congress,  Thomas: Legislative Information on the Internet, Database, Available at 
http://www.thomas.loc.gov.                                                                                                                                                    62 
 
 
TABLE 3: EPA RANKING OF SOURCES 
CONTRIBUTING TO WATER QUALITY IMPAIRMENT, 1996 
 
Rank  Rivers  Lakes  Estuaries 
1  Agriculture  Agriculture  Industrial discharges 
2  Municipal point sources  Unspec. nonpoint sources  Urban runoff/storm sewers 
3  Hydrologic modification  Atmospheric deposition  Municipal point sources 
4  Habitat modification  Urban runoff/storm sewers  Upstream sources 
5  Resource extraction  Municipal point sources  Agriculture 
 









TABLE 4: BENEFITS AND COSTS, REVISED NAAQS 









Ozone  $2.0 to $11.2 billion  $12.7 billion 
Particulate Matter  $26.4 to $145 billion  $48.8 billion 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Office of Management and Budget (1998), reporting EPA estimates from Regulatory 
Impact Analysis.  EPA estimates were in constant 1990 dollars; those reported here are 2000 dollars. Cost 





















TABLE 5: U.S. EMISSIONS OF SEVEN MAJOR AIR POLLUTANTS, 
1970-1998 
 


































































































SOURCES: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards (2000a, 
2000b). 
 
Notes: Figures are indexed from EPA data, with 1970 aggregate U.S. emissions equal to 100 for all 
pollutants except PM10 (1989=100) and PM2.5 (1990=100).  Data for 1970 and 1980 drawn from  U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards (2000a); data for 1989, 
1991-1995 and 1997 drawn from U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air Quality Planning 
and Standards (2000b).  Data for 1990, 1996 and 1998 appear in both reports.  (Data for PM10 differ 
between the two reports -- for this pollutant, the 2000b data were used exclusively.)  Data for particulate 
matter include only directly emitted PM.  No figures are shown for PM10 and PM2.5 in 1970 or 1980; while 
estimates exist, they do not include natural sources, agriculture, forestry, fugitive dust and other sources 
which together comprise almost 90 percent of directly emitted PM10 and almost 70 percent of directly 



























TABLE 6: CHANGES IN AVERAGE AMBIENT CONCENTRATIONS, 










CO  6.2 ppm  3.8 ppm  - 39% 
Lead  0.09 ppm  0.04 ppm  -56% 
NO2  0.021 ppm  0.018 ppm  -14% 
PM10  31.7  g/m
3  23.7  g/m
3  -25% 
SO2  0.0087 ppm  0.0053 ppm  -39% 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards (2000b).  
 
Notes: CO measured as arithmetic mean, 2
nd maximum 8-hour concentration.  Lead measured as arithmetic 
mean, maximum qtr. arithmetic mean.  NO2 measured as daily average arithmetic mean.  PM10 and SO2 





TABLE 7: SUMMARY OF NATIONAL ANNUAL 













VOC  22,715  24,410  17,874  -27% 
NOx  22,747  25,021  18,414  -26% 
SO2  22,361  24,008  18,013  -25% 
CO  94,385  95,572  80,919  -15% 
Primary PM10  28,289  28,768  28,082  -2% 
Primary PM2.5  7,091  7,353  7,216  -2% 
 
 
SOURCE: Table adapted from Freeman (2001), data obtained from U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(1999).                                                                                                                                                    65 
TABLE 8: 













Other Direct Costs 
Legal and Other Transaction 
Shifted Management Focus 
Disrupted Production 
 


































TABLE 9: COST OF SELECTED EPA REGULATIONS 




Environmental Protection Agency Regulation 
 
Year 
Net Cost per Discounted 
Statistical Life (millions of 2000$) 
Toxicity characteristics to determine hazardous wastes 
 
Underground storage tanks: technical requirements 
 
Asbestos prohibitions: manufacture, importation, processing and 
distribution in commerce (total) 
 
National primary and secondary water regulations – Phase II: 
MCLs for 38 contaminants 
 
Hazardous waste management system – wood preservatives 
 
Sewage sludge use and disposal regulations, 40 CFR Part 503 
 
Land disposal restrictions for third third scheduled waste 
 
Hazardous waste management system: final solvents and  
dioxins land disposal restrictions rule 
 
Prohibition on land disposal of first third of scheduled wastes 
(“second sixth” proposal) 
 
Land disposal restrictions, Phase II: universal treatment 
standards and treatment standards for organic toxicity, 
characteristic wastes, and newly listed wastes 
 
Drinking water regulations, synthetic organic chemicals, 
Phase V 
 































































SOURCE: Adapted from Hahn et al. (2000b). 
 
Notes:  All values are millions of 2000 dollars annually; rules are ranked in order of decreasing cost-




APPENDIX A.  TABLES OF SELECTED FEDERAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY INITIATIVES DURING THE 1990s 
 
Table A1.  Air Quality 
 
Item  Description 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)      
  for ozone and particulate matter 
EPA issued new, stricter NAAQS for ozone and PM 
in 1997.  The revised standards faced a court 
challenge from the regulated community.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled in February 2001 that the CAA 
does not allow EPA to consider costs in setting 
NAAQS for the criteria pollutants, and that the 
statute’s mandate that the NAAQS protect the public 
health with “an adequate margin of safety” allows an 
acceptable scope of discretion to EPA. 
Multi-state air quality management – NOx  In 1998, EPA’s NOx State Implementation Plan Call 
required 22 states and D.C. to submit strategies to 
reduce NOx emissions. In response, twelve 
Northeastern states and D.C. (the Northeast Ozone 
Transport Region) implemented a regional NOx cap-
and-trade system in 1999 to reduce emissions from 
large stationary sources.  
1990 Clean Air Act Amendment implementation 








Maximum Achievable Control Technology  








Policy change, state taxes on regulated air pollutants        












Tier 1 vehicle emissions standards 
  
 
Title IV of the CAAA created the SO2 trading 
program.  Phase I began in 1995; 110 electric power-
generating plants received emissions limits and were 
required to have permits to cover their emissions.  
Phase II began in 2000,  incorporating most 
remaining plants. A robust market of bilateral permit 
trading emerged in the 1990s. 
 
The CAAA mandated that EPA issue “Maximum 
Achievable Control Technology” (MACT) standards 
for 188 toxic air pollutants.  From 1992 through 
August 2000, EPA issued technology standards for 
45 of these substances, covering 82 categories of 
industrial sources. Some emissions averaging is 
allowed for sources in the petroleum and hazardous 
organic chemical industries.2 
 
The CAAA allow states to tax regulated air 
pollutants to recover administrative costs, and areas 
in extreme non-compliance may charge higher rates. 
(Under this structure Los Angeles’ SCAQMD has the 
highest permit fees in the U.S.) 
 
Title II of the CAAA imposed stricter controls on 
mobile air pollution sources as described below. 
 
Since 1995, the nine worst ozone non-attainment 
areas have been required to sell cleaner-burning 
reformulated gasoline.1 EPA’s implementation 
allows refinery-level trading of oxygen, aromatics 













































The CAAA set “Tier 1” exhaust emissions standards 
for CO, hydrocarbons, NOx, and PM for cars and 
trucks beginning with model year 1994.  The NOx 
standard for cars was a 40% reduction over the 1981 
standard. 
 
The CAAA also required EPA to study the need for 
“Tier 2" standards.  EPA reported to Congress in 
1998 that stricter standards would be necessary to 
meet the new NAAQS for ozone and PM.  The final 
Tier 2 rule, issued in 2000, will take effect in 2004.  
It introduces stricter NOx standards and applies the 
same standards, for the first time, to cars, SUVs, and 
light-duty trucks.  The rule also includes a substantial 
reduction in allowable sulfur content of gasoline.  
Vehicle manufacturers may average NOx emissions 
throughout their fleets, and refiners may average, 
bank and trade gasoline sulfur content. 
 
In 2000 EPA issued a Final Rule regarding new 
emissions standards for heavy-duty trucks and buses 
beginning in 2004. EPA’s implementation allows 
trading among engine manufacturers of PM, NOx and 
other emissions.  EPA also proposed new standards 
for diesel fuel quality, beginning in 2006, which 
would cap diesel fuel sulfur content at 15 ppm from 
the current standard of 500 ppm.3 
 
The CAAA required that low-emission vehicles be 
manufactured for sale in California, and clarified that 
states could either adopt the Federal Tier 1 auto 
emission standards or adopt the more stringent 
California low-emission vehicle program standards. 
 
In 1992, EPA issued a final performance standard for 
state vehicle inspection and maintenance programs, 
required for some non-attainment areas under the 
CAAA. Many states, including California, opposed 
the rule on the grounds that it was inflexible, leading 
to changes in 1995 that allowed states to defer 
adoption of some standards. 
 
The CAAA required EPA to regulate 10 categories of 
non-road engine emissions as necessary.4  In 1994 
EPA issued initial standards for large non-road diesel 
engines. In 1997, standards for lawn and garden 
equipment took effect.  EPA has also promulgated 
standards for some marine recreational engines, 
marine diesel engines, locomotives and aircraft in the 
1990s. 
SOURCES: Farrell et al. (1999); Mayer (1995); Stavins (2001); U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 





1. This has been one of the most contentious programs initiated by the CAAA, resulting in conflicts over 
ethanol content, potential health and environmental risks associated with MTBE, an oxygen-increasing 
additive, and the increase in relative competitiveness of gasoline imports. 
2.  The combination of a technology standard and emissions averaging works as follows.  EPA establishes 
MACT requirements for different processes and clarifies the emissions reduction expected from application 
of the MACT.  Regulated entities may then average emissions, so long as average emissions do not exceed 
the reduction expected from applying the MACT to all regulated plants or processes. 
3.  New EPA Administrator Christie Todd Whitman announced the agency’s intention to uphold the stricter 
diesel fuel sulfur content standards in March 2001. 
4.  Categories of non-road engine equipment include lawn and garden, airport service, recreational, marine 
recreational, light commercial, industrial, construction, agricultural, and logging. Commercial marine 




Table A2.  Water Quality 
 
Item  Description 
1996 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments  The 1996 SDWA Amendments abolished the original 
statute’s requirement that EPA regulate 25 new 
contaminants every three years, establishing a 
process for regulating contaminants based on health 
risk, occurrence, and opportunity for risk reduction.  
The Amendments require formal benefit-cost 
analysis of all new maximum contaminant levels 
(MCLs) issued by EPA, and they specifically direct 
EPA to take costs into consideration in setting 
MCLs.1  
Debates over Clean Water Act (CWA) reform and       










Section 303(d) total maximum daily load (TMDL)  



















Section 404 wetlands regulation 
During the 104
th Congress, the House passed a 
comprehensive CWA reauthorization (H.R. 961) that 
would have been more flexible and less prescriptive, 
but the Senate did not take up the bill.4  No 
reauthorization legislation was considered in the 
105
th or 106
th Congress.  Instead, the legislature 
focused on opposing the initiatives under Section 
303(d) and considering reforms to Section 404 
treatment of wetlands, two focal points of CWA 
criticism described below. 
 
Section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act requires states 
to establish TMDLs for water bodies that do not meet 
ambient water quality standards for their designated 
use, despite point source pollution control.2  Until 
the early 1990s, EPA did little to enforce this part of 
the CWA, but in response to multiple lawsuits by 
environmental groups in the 1990s, state courts 
ordered the development of TMDLs.3 EPA convened 
a Federal advisory committee to develop a consistent 
national TMDL program in 1996, proposed 
regulations to clarify and strengthen the TMDL 
program in August 1999, and issued a final rule in 
July 2000.  The proposed and final rule generated 
controversy over states’ capacity to implement 
TMDLs and about their impact on agriculture and 
forestry.  Congress subsequently attached a rider to 
an appropriations bill that prevents EPA from 
spending funds to implement the rule in FY2000 and 
FY2001. 
 
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act is the central 
Federal regulatory and permitting statute for 
wetlands.  No major new wetlands legislation was 
enacted during the 1990s, despite the introduction of 
several bills.  A number of important changes 
occurred during the decade, however.  The Clinton 
Administration expanded wetlands permitting 
requirements to include excavation in 1993, a move 
that was overturned by the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia in 1997.  A U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in 2001 overturned the U.S. Army Corps of  
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Engineers’ 1986 “Migratory Bird Rule”, which had 
allowed regulation of intrastate waters (including 
ponds) that provide habitat for migratory birds. In 
1998, the Army Corps greatly reduced the scope of 
nationwide permit 26, which authorizes discharges 
into non-tidal headwaters and isolated waters, a 
change that resulted in lawsuits by the development 
and commercial communities.6 Finally, the Clinton 
Administration endorsed the concept of wetlands 
mitigation banking in 1993, resulting in EPA 
framework guidance issued in 1995. 
Individual Water Resources Projects  Many large individual water resources projects, often 
funded through annual Water Resources 
Development Acts, were initiated during the 1990s.  
The most extensive of these is the Florida Everglades 
Restoration project, a 36-year, $7.8 billion 
Federal/state plan approved in 2000.  
SOURCES: Tiemann (1999); U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water (2000); Copeland 
(1997, 1999, 2000, 2001); U.S. Supreme Court (2001b); Zinn (1997) 
 
Notes: 
1.  The SDWA Amendments also included significant broadening of the pollution prevention focus of the 
Act, through source water protection standards.  They provided for increased state and Federal monitoring 
flexibility, especially for water systems serving 10,000 or fewer persons. Consistent with the 104
th 
Congress’ focus on reducing unfunded mandates, the Amendments created a new drinking water state 
revolving loan fund to help communities meet increasingly stringent drinking water quality mandates.  The 
SDWA Amendments also required all public water systems to issue annual reports to customers, revealing 
data on contaminants in drinking water, system violations of MCLs, and other information. 
2.  The TMDL should be set at a level necessary to attain the applicable water quality standard for the water 
body’s designated use.  Designated uses include recreational use, public water supply, and industrial water 
supply, for example, and each designated use has an applicable water quality standard.  Generally, attaining 
the TMDL involves regulating non-point source pollution, given that point-source permitting has been 
insufficient to achieve compliance with Federal standards for these water bodies.   
3. Through October 2000, environmental groups had filed 40 legal actions in 38 states – EPA is under court 
order or consent decree in many states to ensure that TMDLs are established either by the state or by EPA 
itself (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water 2000). 
4.  The 103
rd Congress had considered similar legislation (H.R. 3948, S. 2093), but no floor action on CWA 
reauthorization was taken in either house. 
6.  The so-called “nationwide permits” which authorize landowners to proceed with specified categories of 
activities without obtaining individual permits, reducing regulatory burden.  The waters governed by permit 
26 are often difficult to identify as wetlands because they may appear dry for much of the year and do not 
exhibit the vegetation characteristic of wetlands, but scientific evidence is mounting for their important 




Table A3.  Hazardous Waste and Toxics 
 
Item  Description 
Expansion of Toxics Release Inventory  The Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) was initiated in 
1988 under the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-to-Know Act Section 313 and requires firms to 
report on use, storage and release of hazardous 
chemicals.  A 1993 Clinton executive order required 
TRI reporting by Federal facilities.  In 1994, EPA 
added 286 new chemicals to the list requiring 
reporting in the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), 
nearly an 80 percent increase in the number of listed 
chemicals.  In 1999, EPA lowered reporting 
thresholds for many persistent bioaccumulative toxic 
chemicals and added more of these chemicals to the 
TRI list. The 104
th Congress considered but did not 
enact legislation that would have restricted EPA’s 
ability to require TRI reporting. 
RCRA Corrective Action program  EPA regulations under RCRA’s Corrective Action 
program were promulgated in 1990 and revised in 
1996.  The study, decisionmaking and cleanup phases 
defined by EPA closely resemble the Superfund 
process.  In 1993, EPA released a total cost estimate 
for the RCRA Corrective Action program of $18.7 
billion (in discounted 1992 dollars). 
Debates over reform of the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and  
Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund)  
Superfund reauthorization and reform were 
considered in many forms during the 105
th Congress, 
but no legislation was passed. The taxes that support 
the Superfund trust fund (primarily excise taxes on 
petroleum and specified chemical feedstocks and a 
corporate environmental income tax) expired in 1995 
and have not been reinstated.1 
Securities and Exchange reporting requirements  In 1993, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
tightened reporting requirements of contingent 
liabilities under Superfund for publicly-held 
companies. 
Brownfields Cleanup  EPA started the Brownfields Economic 
Redevelopment Initiative in 1993 to address sites 
contaminated by hazardous substances that do not 
warrant Superfund cleanup.  The program was 
initiated administratively and was financed from 
Superfund appropriations until 1997, when 
appropriations legislation specified funding for 
brownfields activities.  In 1996, the EPA 
Administrator removed 25,000 potential brownfields 
sites from Superfund’s list of sites suspected of being 
contaminated by hazardous substances; the listing 
had prevented many of the sites from sale or 
development.  As of January 2001, more than 300 
brownfields assessment pilot projects had been 
initiated.2 





1.  The revenues now flowing into the trust fund come from so-called “potentially responsible parties”, 
interest on the fund’s investments, fines, and penalties. See Reisch (2000). 
2.  Many programs have been created by EPA and other Federal entities under the umbrella of brownfields 
development.  See Reisch (2001) for descriptions.   
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Table A4.  Solid Waste 
 
Item  Description 
Federal procurement requirements for  
recycled  content 
Issued in 1993, E.O. 12873 required Federal agencies 
to purchase recycled copier paper. Issued in 1998, 
E.O. 13101 strengthened these requirements.  EPA 
designated an additional 19 recycled content product 
categories for procurement preferences in 1995, 
added 12 more categories in 1997, and proposed 19 
more for addition in 1998. 
Mercury-Containing and Rechargeable Battery  
Management Act of 1996 (Battery Act) 
The Battery Act requires uniform labels indicating 
that nickel-cadmium and some lead-acid batteries 
must be recycled or disposed of properly. 
Manufacturers, distributors and other suppliers must 
provide proper disposal opportunities. The law also 
prohibits the use of some mercury-containing 
batteries, with the goal of phasing them out 
completely. 
Solid Waste Landfill Criteria  Municipal solid waste landfill criteria were 
promulgated by EPA under RCRA Subtitle D in 
1991. Non-municipal landfill criterial were 
promulgated in 1996.  Various location, design, 
operating, monitoring and corrective action 
requirements became effective between 1993 and 
1997.1 
Proposed restrictions on waste transport  During the 1990s, Congress often considered 
restricting interstate waste transport.  State and local 
governments’ ability to designate disposal sites for 
privately-collected waste has been the subject of 
lawsuits; in 1994 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that 
such “flow control” violates the Interstate Commerce 
Clause.  At the time, 39 states and D.C. had enacted 
these laws. 
Proposed national deposit-refund bills  The National Beverage Container Reuse and 
Recycling Act was proposed in the House in 1994 
and would have introduced a 10-cent deposit on 
bottles and cans in states that did not recycle at least 
70 percent of such containers.  A similar bill was 
proposed in the Senate, but the advance deposit 
would have varied with recycled content. 
SOURCES: Macauley and Walls (2000); McCarthy (2000). 
 
Notes: 
1.  Air emissions from municipal solid waste landfills and incinerators are regulated under CAA Sections 
111 and 129.  Rules for landfills were promulgated in 1996, and rules for incinerators in 1991, with 
maximum achievable control technologies identified for some hazardous air pollutants in 1995 and 1997.  





Table A5.  Global Climate Change 
 
Item  Description 
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change  In June 1992, the U.N. Framework Convention on 
Climate Change was developed at the U.N. 
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio 
de Janeiro, Brazil.  The U.S. was an early signatory 
under President George Bush, and the U.S. Senate 
ratified the convention in October 1992.   
Climate Change Action Plan  In April 1993, President Clinton ordered Federal 
agencies to design a plan to stabilize U.S. greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions at 1990 levels by 2000.  In 
October, the Administration released a U.S. Climate 
Change Action Plan suggesting 52 voluntary 
measures to meet this emissions goal.1   
U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation  The U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation was 
established in 1993 under the Climate Change Action 
Plan.  Joint Implementation arrangements allow 
entities in one country to partially meet their GHG 
reduction commitments by financing cost-effective 
mitigation in another country.  The U.S. Initiative 
through 2000 had approved 26 arrangements 
whereby U.S. firms agreed to finance projects in 11 
other countries.2  
Willingness to accept legally-binding targets  In July 1996 at the second Conference of the Parties 
to the U.N. Framework Convention, the U.S. 
delegation released a position statement calling for 
“legally binding mid-term targets” for GHG 
emissions among parties to the Convention.3  
Byrd-Hagel Resolution (S. Res. 98)  The 105
th Congress unanimously approved S. Res. 98 
in July 1997, stating that the U.S. should not approve 
any agreement at the upcoming third Conference of 
the Parties in Kyoto that did not impose binding 
GHG emission targets on all nations, and requested 
that the Administration estimate the costs of any 
protocol submitted for Senate approval.   
Kyoto Protocol  The U.N. Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change was 
completed in December 1997.  Most industrialized 
nations agreed to legally binding GHG emission 
reductions–the U.S. was to implement a 7% 
reduction below 1990 levels by  2012.  The U.S. 
became the 60
th signatory of the Protocol under 
President Bill Clinton in November 1998, despite the 
fact that the Protocol did not meet the Senate’s 
approval stipulations, outlined in S. Res. 98. 
Energy Information Administration study  In 1998, the U.S. Energy Information Administration 
produced a report analyzing the potential economic 
impacts of U.S. compliance with the Kyoto Protocol 
emissions targets, at the request of the House 
Committee on Science.  The report estimated very 
high costs: a 4% reduction in annual GDP through 
2010 compared to business-as-usual, a 53% gasoline 
price increase and an 87% average electricity price 
increase. Cost estimates assumed that the U.S. target 
would be met entirely by reducing U.S. carbon  
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emissions, with no net offsets from sinks or other 
GHGs, and no emissions trading. 
Council of Economic Advisors study  Also in 1998, the President’s Council of Economic 
Advisors (CEA) produced an estimate of the costs to 
the U.S. of complying with the GHG emissions 
reduction target specified in the Kyoto Protocol.  The 
CEA estimated costs on the order of 0.5% of annual 
GDP, if flexible (market-based) policy instruments 
were employed. The CEA study also predicted no 
negative effect on the U.S. trade deficit, small 
increases in gasoline prices ($0.05 per gallon), and 
no significant effect on aggregate employment.  
U.S. advocacy for market-based instruments  A key component of the Clinton Administration’s 
position on climate change policies was support for 
cost-effective approaches, including market-based 
instruments.  The Administration’s formal proposal 
released in preparation for Kyoto called for domestic 
and international emissions trading and international 
joint implementation.  The U.S. proposed rules for 
international emissions trading in 1998, at 
preparatory talks for the fourth Conference of the 
Parties.  The U.S. proposal faced substantial 
opposition, most significantly from the European 
Union.  No agreement was reached on emissions 
trading at the fourth (1998), fifth (1999), or sixth 
(2000) Conference of the Parties. 
SOURCES: Morrissey (2000); Shogren and Toman (2000); Parker and Blodgett (1999); U.S. Department 
of Energy, Energy Information Administration (1998). 
 
Notes: 
1.  This Plan was substantially similar to that developed under the  Bush Administration in 1992. 
2.  These are merely pilot projects, as the U.S. is not  party to any binding agreement on GHG emissions. 
3.  The position statement released at COP-2 also noted U.S. acceptance of the scientific findings on 
climate change summarized by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its second 
assessment released in 1995, and it rejected uniform “harmonized policies” in favor of flexible policy 




APPENDIX B.  SELECTED FEDERAL 
NATURAL RESOURCE POLICY INITIATIVES DURING THE 1990s 
 
 
Table B1.  Public Lands and Species Preservation 
 
Item  Description 























Policy on old-growth cutting 
The U.S. Forest Service under Clinton underwent a 
substantial shift in priorities, emphasizing 
ecosystem management over timber production and 
extraction.   
 
In 1992, a USFS policy reduced the amount of 
timber harvested by clear-cutting in national forests.   
In two speeches delivered in 1998 and 1999, USFS 
Chief Mike Dombeck unveiled the agency’s 
“Natural Resource Agenda for the 21
st Century”, 
emphasizing: (1) watershed protection; (2) 
sustainable forest system ecosystem management; 
(3) forest roads; and (4) recreation. 
 
President Clinton announced the Administration’s 
Roadless Initiative in October 1999, instructing the 
USFS to develop regulations for long-term 
protection of inventoried roadless areas within the 
national forest system.  The USFS Roadless Rule, 
submitted to the Federal Register in January 2001,  
placed 58.5 million acres of unroaded Federal forest 
lands in 39 states off limits to new roadbuilding.1   
 
Also in January 2001, Forest Service Chief 
Dombeck announced a new USFS policy on old-
growth cutting.2 This was a substantial reversal of 
previous policy, which promoted the cutting of the 
largest, oldest trees first.  The Forest Service 
estimates that the change could affect 20 percent of 
the U.S. timber harvest from national forests 
scheduled in the coming year, and as much as 50 
percent in the forests of the Pacific Northwest. 
Reduction of subsidies for extractive resource uses on 















In 1993, President Clinton announced plans to 
reduce subsidies for grazing, timber extraction, 
mining and water resources development on Federal 
lands as part of his deficit reduction plan. Within 
one month of this announcement, pressure from 
Western Senators led to the elimination of most 
disputed provisions from Clinton’s overall budget 
proposal.  Some of the initiatives continued in other 
forms, as described below.  
 
While the plan to eliminate below-cost timber sales 
was eliminated from Clinton’s final budget 
proposal, the USFS drafted a plan to phase out 
below-cost sales on one-half of forest service lands 
over four years.  The proposal was made public in 























Mining royalties and patents 
Administration policy by Assistant Secretary of 
Agriculture James Lyons in Senate hearings.  By 
USFS estimates, 77 of the 120 national forests 
showed net losses from timber sales over the period 
FY1989-FY1993, and 60 reported losses in every 
year over this period.3 
 
The Administration pursued increases in fees for 
grazing livestock on public lands with more vigor, 
but not much more success.  In 1993, the 
Administration proposed increasing the baseline 
Federal grazing fee by almost 200%, resulting in a 
Senate filibuster on FY1994 Interior Appropriations 
during the 103
rd Congress.  The Administration 
continued to lobby for fee increases, and the 104
th 
Congress established a new fee formula that resulted 
in a small increase in the baseline fee. 
 
In 1993, the Administration proposed introducing 
royalties for hardrock mining on Federal lands. In 
the 103
rd Congress, the House and Senate 
considered bills that would have required a royalties 
of 2 to 8 percent of gross income.  Since 1994, 
Congress has enacted a series of one-year 
moratoriums on the issuance of new mining patents 
for hardrock minerals.  Patents give mining claim 
holders title to surface and mineral rights on public 
lands, at a cost of $2.50-$5.00 per acre, under the 
1872 Mining Law.  The Law allows production of 
minerals on public lands without a patent, however, 
in which case claimants pay no fees to the Federal 
government.4 
Designation of new wilderness areas, national 
monuments 
One of the most visible natural resource policy 
developments of the 1990s was the Clinton 
Administration’s designation of more than 20 new 
national monuments and expansion of three existing 
national monuments, under the 1906 Antiquities 
Act.  The designations and expansions added almost 
6 million acres to Federal public lands.5 Clinton 
also created the largest protected area in U.S. 
history, the 84 million acre Northwest Hawaiian 
Islands Coral Reef Ecosystem Reserve.6  During the 
1990s, the Congress also created one new national 
monument of 272,000 acres, and one national 
preserve (the Mojave Desert) of 1.6 million acres.   
Extension of moratorium on offshore oil leasing  In 1998, Clinton extended a moratorium on new 
offshore oil leasing in the U.S., which was 
originally established by President George Bush.  
The moratorium extends through 2012, and it 
permanently bars new leasing in national marine 
sanctuaries. 
Conservation and Reinvestment Act (CARA)  A key component of the Clinton Administration’s 
environmental policy agenda, CARA would have 
funded the Federal Land and Water Conservation 
Fund through permanent, rather than annual, 






th Congresses and would have 
diverted $45 billion over 15 years from outer 
continental shelf oil and gas revenues to land and 
easement acquisition, wildlife protection and other 
natural resource activities.  The House passed a 
version of the bill in the 106
th Congress, but 
opposition from Western delegations prevented the 
Senate from taking any floor action (although the 
bill was approved in Committee).7 












































Critical habitat designation 
Authorization for Federal spending under the 
Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) expired in 
1992. Prohibitions and requirements have remained 
in force, and Congress has appropriated annual 
funds to support ESA activities, but all attempts at 
reauthorization in the 1990s (including the most 
serious attempt during the 105
th Congress) failed.  
Important administrative changes are described 
below. 
 
The Clinton Administration heavily emphasized 
habitat conservation plans (HCPs) as a tool to 
manage endangered and threatened species on non-
Federal lands.  Under Section 10 of the ESA, private 
landowners applying for an “incidental take” permit 
must submit an HCP, in which they agree to restrict 
some uses in the interest of species and habitat 
protection in exchange for the permit.  More than 
250 habitat conservation plans were completed 
between 1992 and 2000, compared to 14 between 
1982 and 1992. The plans are more flexible than 
direct enforcement of the Endangered Species Act.8 
 
One major criticism has been that the ESA actually 
discourages landowner efforts to improve species 
populations, since larger populations require 
expanded protections.  Three Clinton-era changes 
sought to reverse this.  First, voluntary “safe harbor 
agreements” guarantee that increases in species 
populations on private lands will not restrict future 
land use decisions.  Second, the controversial “no 
surprises rule” guarantees that a landowner properly 
carrying out an HCP will not experience further 
restrictions or costs without mutual consent.9 Third, 
“candidate conservation agreements” allow 
landowners to protect declining species that are not 
yet listed, in exchange for assurance that no 
additional measures will be required when or if the 
species is listed.  Many of the Congressional 
reauthorization attempts sought to incorporate these 
provisions into the ESA. 
 
Under the ESA, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
(FWS) is required to establish critical habitat 
designations upon each species listing.  The agency 
has long maintained that such designations are 
extremely costly and provide little species  
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conservation benefit beyond the ESA’s other 
provisions.  In its 1999 budget request, the FWS put 
critical habitat designation last on its list of 
priorities, citing its inability to comply with existing 
demands in this area given budgetary constraints -- 
critical habitat has been designated for only 10 
percent of listed species.  FWS has been sued 13 
times over this issue and lost every case.  In the late 
1990s, both the Clinton Administration and the 
Congress proposed limiting critical habitat 
designation required under the ESA; since no 
reauthorization was accomplished, the issue remains 
to be resolved. 
Fisheries Management  The Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-
297) amended the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act, imposing a 
four-year moratorium on new individual tradeable 
quota programs among the nation’s eight regional 
fishery management councils and repealing one 
such program that had been created in 1995. The 
Act did not, however, repeal the other five existing 
ITQ programs. 
 
SOURCES: Booth (2001); Buck (1996); Buck and Corn (2001); Cody (1996); Dombeck (1998); Gorte 
(1994); Humphries and Vincent (2001); Vincent (1998); Zinn (2001). 
 
Notes:  
1.  President George W. Bush placed a 60-day “stay” on this and all Federal rules published in the Federal 
Register and not yet in effect as of January 20, 2001.  The Roadless Rule will take effect May 12, 2001, if it 
is kept in place by the current Administration and Congress. 
2. The “policy directive” will not have the force of Federal law, and can be reversed by the new Forest 
Service Chief at will. 
3. Net losses in Alaska’s Tongass National Forest were the greatest – more than $13 million per year in 
FY1992 and FY1993. See Gorte (1994). 
4.  While it is difficult to estimate the fair market value of mineral-bearing lands, a 1989 GAO report 
reviewed 20 patents, estimating that Federal revenues totalled $4,500 from 1970-1989, on lands valued 
between $13.8 and $47.9 million.  Of course, a direct comparison like this ignores the speculative nature of 
the mining industry and does not indicate what portion of the land value represents actual profits.  See 
Gordon and Van Doren (1998). 
5.  This was the largest expansion of U.S. Federal lands since President Jimmy Carter withdrew 56 million 
acres of Alaskan lands in 1978, creating 15 new monuments and expanding two existing monuments.  See 
Vincent (1998).  All but one of Clinton’s designations (Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument) 
were declared in the final year of his presidency, from January 2000 to January 2001. A notable exception 
was the coastal plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge which, despite heavy lobbying, was not 
declared a national monument.  The 1995 shutdown of the Federal government was due, in part to a budget 
legislation rider that would have allowed oil and gas exploration in ANWR’s coastal plain, which  
contributed to Clinton’s veto.  Similar legislation was considered during the 106
th Congress. 
6.  The Northwest Hawaiian Island Coral Reef Ecosystem Reserve was seven times the size of the existing 
U.S. National Marine Sanctuary system at the time of the Hawaiian reserve’s declaration. 
7.  The bill has been reintroduced in the 107
th Congress; the George W. Bush Administration had not taken 
a position on CARA as of March 2001.  See Zinn (2001). 
8.  These plans can be very expensive, however.  The 17,000-acre Coachella Valley HCP to protect an 
endangered lizard in California cost $25 million; the Balcones Canyonlands HCP near Austin, Texas may 
cost $200 million.  The plans are implemented with a combination of Federal, state, local and private funds, 
and may involve a mitigation fee assessed on development (the fee was $1,950 per acre for the Stephens’ 
kangaroo rat HCP in southern California).  See Beatley (1995).  
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9.  Some changes can be carried out under this rule by the government, but at no cost to the landowner.  No 
formal rule was issued when the “no surprises rule” was introduced in the early 1990s, and environmental 
groups sued the Interior Department, alleging inadequate species protection under existing law.  The 
agency settled the case, but then issued a formal rule in 1998 establishing “no surprises” as regulation.  See 
Buck and Corn (2001). 
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